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We  investigate  the  effect  of  trade  integration  on  interstate  military  conflict.  Our  empirical 
analysis, based on a large panel data set of 243,225 country-pair observations from 1950 to 2000, 
confirms that an increase in bilateral trade interdependence significantly promotes peace. It also 
suggests that the peace-promotion effect of bilateral trade integration is significantly higher for 
contiguous countries that are likely to experience more conflict. More importantly, we find that 
not only bilateral trade but global trade openness also significantly promotes peace. It shows, 
however, that an increase in global trade openness reduces the probability of interstate conflict 
more for countries far apart from each other than it does for countries sharing borders. The 
results also show that military conflict between countries significantly reduces not only bilateral 
trade interdependence but also global trade integration. The main finding of the peace-promotion 
effect of bilateral and global trade integration holds robust when controlling for the natural and 
geopolitical  characteristics  of  dyads  of  states  that  may  influence  the  probability  of  military 
conflict and for the simultaneous determination of trade and peace. 
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1.  Introduction 
“The great extent and rapid increase of international trade, in being the principal guarantee of 
the peace of the world, is the great permanent security for the uninterrupted progress of the 
ideas, the institutions, and the character of the human race.” (John Stuart Mill, Principles of 
Political Economy, London: Longmans, 1909, p.582) 
Globalization has been one of the most salient features of the world economy over the 
last century. Emerging markets and developing countries continue to integrate into the global 
trading system. World trade has increased rapidly, particularly since World War II—from 17.8% 
of world GDP in 1960 to 47.4% in 2005.  
There has been a long tradition among social scientists to try to understand the economic, 
political, and social consequences of globalization. It has always been a hotly-debated topic—not 
merely  within  academia  but  among  the  general  public  as  well—whether  globalization 
significantly affects economic growth, income inequality, national identity, and so on.  
This  paper  focuses  on  the  effect  of  trade  integration  on  international  relations, 
specifically  military  conflict  between  individual  states  (interstate  conflict).  Recent  literature 
shows that military conflict can be extremely disruptive to economic activity and impede long-
term economic performance (Davis and Weinstein, 2002, Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides, 2004, 
and  Barro,  2006).  In  particular,  they  empirically  study  the  effect  military  conflict  has  on 
international trade. They find that conflict between countries significantly reduces international 
trade and thus seriously damages national and global economic welfare (Glick and Taylor, 2005, 
and Blomberg and Hess, 2006). However, the opposite relationship between international trade 
and the probability of interstate military conflict—whether international trade has any significant 
impact on conflict—is still controversial. 
There  is  ongoing  debate  among  scholars  whether  the  increase  of  bilateral  economic 
interdependence reduces interstate conflict. The ―liberal peace‖ view in political science—traced 
back  to  Montesquieu,  Kant,  Angell,  and  Schumpeter—emphasizes  that  mutual  economic 
interdependence can be a conduit of peace. It suggests that a higher degree of bilateral economic 
interdependence limits the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. For instance, a 
more trade-dependent state is less likely to fight a partner because of the larger opportunity cost  
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associated with the loss of trade. Business elites—who gain most from an increased economic 
interdependence—will  also  lobby  the  state  to  restrict  the  use  of  military  force  against  an 
important trading partner.   
While the ―liberal peace‖ view is convincing, there are numerous counter-arguments. For 
instance,  the  dependency  theorists  (Wallerstein,  1974)  and  neo-Marxists  (Emmanuel,  1972), 
argue  that  asymmetric  economic  interdependence  could  lead  to  negative  consequences  in  a 
country—such  as  exploited  concession  and  threatened  national  autonomy—thereby  creating 
interstate tensions and conflicts (Dos Santos, 1970 and Keohane and Nye, 1973). Many conflicts 
in the mercantilist era evolved out of trade disputes.
1 
Empirical  studies  have  also  investigated  whether  bilateral  trade  interdependence 
increases or reduces the likelihood of military conflict betwee n trading partners. Similar to 
theoretical literature, the findings of these studies are  ambiguous. Earlier studies, such as 
Polachek  (1980)  and  Polacheck,  Robst,  and  Chang  (1999),  show  that  there  is  negative 
relationship between bilateral trade volume and   the frequency of interstate military conflict. 
However, Barbieri (1996, 2002) investigates  the relationship between  various measures of 
bilateral  trade  links  and  military  conflict.  She  finds  that  a  measure  of  bilateral  trade 
interdependence has a significantly positive impact on military conflict. In reverse, subsequent 
research—including Oneal and Russett (1999) and Gartzke and Li (2003)—show that with the 
use of a different measure of bilateral trade interdependence, the interdependence appears to 
reduce military conflict.  
In contrast to the numerous studies on the impact of bilateral trade interdependence on 
military conflict, there are only a few studies examining the role of global trade integration.
2 If 
global  trade  integration  increases  trade  interdependence  uniformly  with  all  bilateral  trade 
partners, the distinction between bilateral and global trade integration is not critical. However, 
deeper integration into global markets can take place  unevenly, lowering trade interdependence 
with some trading partners. The overall impact of trade integration on interstate conflict is likely 
to depend not only on the change in bilateral trade interdependence but also on global trade 
integration. 
                                                 
1 See Ronald Findlay and Kevin O‘Rourke, Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second 
Millennium, Princeton University press, 2007  
2 The phrase ―global trade integration‖ implies ―trade openness,‖ which is often measured by the ratio of total trade 
to GDP at the aggregate national level.  
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An increase in global trade openness is expected to reduce the probability of military 
conflict as it leads to an increase in the extent of bilateral trade interdependence. However, when 
the level of bilateral trade interdependence is controlled, the effect of increased global trade 
openness on the probability of bilateral conflict is not clear. Barbieri and Peters (2003) find 
―trade openness‖ has a significantly negative impact on the probability of military conflict. In 
contrast, a recent study by Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008)—henceforth, MMT—shows that 
―multilateral trade openness,‖ that is, global trade openness, increases the probability of inter-
state military conflicts.  
In general, as long as bilateral conflicts increase trade costs not only in bilateral trade but 
in multilateral trade, dyads of states—or specific pairs of states—that are more dependent on the 
world economy are more inclined to avoid a war. Open states can be more peaceful because they 
become more susceptible to political freedom and democracy, and better practice international 
law and apply good governance. Trade openness can also lead to an ―expansion of bureaucratic 
structure,‖ which is concerned about economic interests in addition to security interests—and 
thus less likely to resort to military actions (Domke, 1988). However, MMT argue that countries 
more open to global trade have a higher probability of dyadic conflict because an increase in 
multilateral trade openness reduces relative bilateral dependence to any given country and thus 
lowers the opportunity cost of military conflict.  
The  effect  of  trade  integration  on  interstate  conflict  can  also  vary  depending  on 
characteristics of dyads of states. For instance, a war might have a more disastrous impact on 
nations geographically close than distant states. If so, an increase in bilateral and global trade 
integration may affect the probability of conflict between dyads of states differently depending 
on geographical distance. In addition, interstate economic and political relations tend to be more 
important for neighboring countries. Then, greater bilateral trade interdependence can be more 
helpful  in  promoting  peace  for  countries  closer  geographically  by  preventing  disputes  from 
escalating into military conflicts. 
While several empirical studies have investigated the effect of bilateral trade integration 
on military conflict between countries, there is little systematic empirical research assessing the 
peace-promotion effect of both bilateral and global trade integration (MMT 2008)—and how it 
relates to the geographical characteristics of states. There remains a lack of consensus in these 
findings. This paper attempts to fill this gap and produces novel results.    
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An empirical assessment of the impact of trade integration on military conflict is done 
based on regressions utilizing a panel data set of dyadic observations from 1950 to 2000. The 
results  show  that  an  increase  in  bilateral  trade  interdependence  and  global  trade  integration 
significantly  promotes  peace  between  countries.  The  strong  positive  effect  of  global  trade 
openness on peace is a novel finding, contrasting the result of MMT. We also find that the 
impact of trade integration on military conflict varies depending on the geographical proximity 
between  countries.  Bilateral  trade  interdependence  promotes  peace  more  significantly  for 
contiguous countries, whereas global trade openness contributes more to peace between distant 
countries.  The  results  also  show  that  geopolitical  factors—such  as  bilateral  distance,  joint 
democracy, relative military capability, UN voting correlation, oil exports, religious similarity, 
and economic institutions like FTA/RTA—influence the probability of military conflict among 
dyads of states.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the conceptual framework 
that explains the effect of bilateral trade interdependence and global trade integration on military 
interstate conflict. In Section 3, we explain data and the empirical methodology for evaluating 
the effects of bilateral and global trade integration on the probability of military conflict. Section 
4 presents and discusses estimation results. Section 5 analyzes the impact of military conflict on 
bilateral and global (multilateral) trade integration. Concluding remarks follow in Section 6.  
 
 
2.  The Conceptual Framework 
 
2.1. The Impact of Trade Integration on Conflict 
There  are  several  frameworks  that  explain  the  occurrence  of  military  conflict.  The 
―expected utility model‖ focuses on the gain and loss incurred by a conflict and suggests that a 
decision between cooperation and conflict by engaging parties can be explained based on a cost-
benefit analysis (Polachek, 1980 and Polachek et al., 1999). This framework is in general based 
on a decision theory focused on ―one‖ agent problem.  
In contrast, game theory-based models focus on the interaction by two or more agents. 
The  Nash  equilibrium  surmises  a  foreign  policy  function  (reaction  function)  for  countries. 
Establishing a bargaining protocol makes it possible to examine a country‘s behavior and to  
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analyze  the  conditions  for  a  peaceful  settlement  of  disputes.  Powell  (2002)  says  that  a 
Rubinstein-type bargaining model contributes much to the analysis of international relations, and 
its bargaining solution draws a Pareto-optimal outcome under complete information about each 
agent. Also, bargaining is more an option under the multi-agent set-up. When more than two 
agents settle disputes through bargaining, more solutions are available. Each agent is able to 
bandwagon (or build a coalition) as well as balance a power at equilibrium (Wagner, 1986, and 
Niou  and  Ordeshook,  1990).  The  possibility  that  a  third  party  intervenes  in  a  conflict  is 
considered as well (Werner, 2000). 
However, even though a bargaining solution can guarantee a Pareto-superior outcome, 
bargaining often breaks down. And war, the most inefficient outcome, still pervades across the 
globe. Fearon (1995) suggests a ―rationalist view of war‖—that asymmetric information can be 
behind this perplexing situation. Agents can have incomplete or imperfect information about 
who benefits more from an agreement, thus leading to a breakdown in negotiations. Moreover, 
Fearon (1995) and Lake and Powell (1999) suggest that states often fail to agree to the most 
efficient outcome for both—as opposed to fighting—because they are unable to make a credible 
commitment to uphold a settlement. Grossman (2003) examines examples of wars to find out 
why some disputes are peacefully settled, whereas others are not.  
Only a few studies use theoretical models to investigate the role of trade in interstate 
conflicts.
3 Polachek (1980) and Polachek et al. (1999), using the expected utility model, explain 
that trade  makes conflict between countries more costly —thus a high level of bilateral trade 
makes the optimal level of conflict lower. Trade between countries is also considered as a net 
pay-off  (opportunity  cost  of  war)  or  commitment  under  the  bargaining  model.  Trade  and 
economic interdependence between countries contributes to peaceful resolutions of disputes by 
raising the opportunity cost of conflict. Based on the rationalist view of war, MMT formulate a 
war-escalating  mechanism  under  asymmetric  information,  and  combine  this  with  new  trade 
theory to shed light on how trade liberalization affects peace. They explain how increased trade 
costs and labor loss as the result of conflict affects the incentive to escalate war. They argue that 
bilateral trade liberalization reduces the probability of war, whereas multilateral trade integration 
can provoke war. 
                                                 
3 Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001) and subsequent research examine the role of trade in ―domestic conflict.‖ See 
Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) for a survey.   
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In this paper, we propose a simple conceptual framework based on expected utility model 
that examines the effect of trade on conflict. In order to examine the effect of trade on conflict, 
we focus on the welfare loss by conflict as the factor that affects the probability of war rather 
than the bargaining rule itself—who escalates war and why? and what mechanism can explain 
war even if war is costly. Therefore, we formulate a simple equation: the probability of conflict 
( ) Pr(conflict )  as  a  function  of  the  welfare  loss  (L)  from  engaging  in  a  military  conflict  as 
opposed to remaining at peace.  
0 Pr ), ( ) Pr(     L L P conflict ij  and 
) ( ) (
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Moreover, we assume that   the  utility function of  a  country consists of t hree  main 
variables—total production ( i y ) and bilateral and multilateral trade costs ( ih ij t t , )—in order to 
examine the marginal effect of trade integration on conflict.
5 The utility of country  i  is defined 
by four arguments,  ) , , , ( ih ij j i t t y y x  . Also, it is assumed that bilateral conflicts between i and 
j  cause  x  to  be  damaged  as  ) 1 (   x ,  where  ) , , , ( multi bil j i         .    is  the  loss  of 
production by conflict (%), bil   is an increase in bilateral trade cost (%) by conflict and  multi   is an 
increase in the multilateral trade cost (%) by conflict. 
The welfare loss by bilateral conflict between iand  j  is described by 
        mul t bil t j y i y multi bil j i mul bil j i L L L L L L                ) , , , (                (2) 
where  X L  is the elasticity of the welfare loss(L) with respect to X.  
 
We introduce a Dixit-Stiglitz type monopolistic competition model for trade to measure 
the welfare of the state in terms of production and trade cost. The utility function is a constant 
elasticity  of  substitution  (CES)  utility  function  and  ih c  is  the  consumption  by  consumers  in 
country i of goods from each country h of the N  countries worldwide. Consumers in country i  
maximize the utility function such as,
6  
                                                 
4 For ease in interpretation, we define the welfare loss as the percent change in utility (U), which is represented in 
the form of elasticity. 
5 This framework and notations follow MMT very closely. 
6 This is a derivation of the monopolistic competition model with trade cost. See the theoretical foundation of the 




















ih i i c C U                         (3) 
where   is the constant elasticity of substitution among the consumption goods. The consumer‘s 






i ih ih y c p
1
                   (4) 
where  i y  is nominal income of country i ,  ih p  is the price of country h  goods  for country i  
consumers: ih h ih t p p  ,  where  h p  is  the  exporter‘s  supply  price.  Price  differences  between 
countries are due to iceberg trade costs ( ih t ), which are embedded by exporters. The nominal 
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, 
which is the market clear condition from the perspective of exporters.  
We solve the optimization problem (3) subject to (4) by assuming trade barriers are 
symmetric.





































































y U          (5) 
At equilibrium, the utility of country i is positively associated with total production of 
each country and the utility decreases with trade costs. Substituting (5) into (1) and assuming a 
―symmetric‖  equilibrium  between  two  countries,  we  solve  for L ,  which  is  a  percent 
change(decrease) of welfare by conflict (see Appendix 1).
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8 This condition is similar to that in MMT (2008, equation 9), which derived the following war probability in terms 
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Therefore, if  L —the collateral damage of the utility by conflict—is sufficiently high, 
countries will be willing to avoid conflict as much as possible, which means an increase in L 
decreases the probability of conflict ( 0 ) Pr(    L conflict ij ). In other words, under the assumed 
conflict mechanism, the smaller the negative deviation of utility by conflict (the lower the value 
of L), the higher the probability of conflict. 
From  equation  (6),  we  can  examine  the  effect  of  trade  integration  on  conflict.  First, 
bilateral trade integration—defined by an increase in  ij M —reduces the probability of conflict. 
This is clear under the assumption that  0  bil  : conflict increases bilateral trade costs.  
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Second, the effect of multilateral trade integration—defined as unilateral increase in  ih M  





































































Thus,  our  conceptual  framework  reaches  a  parameterization  problem  to  determine 





 multi , which is the same as that of MMT. Through empirical analysis, we 










 multi >0.   
A bilateral war substantially increases multilateral trade costs, so the opportunity cost of a 
war increases with the level of multilateral trade openness. Thus, a higher level of multilateral 
trade openness is an incentive to avoid war. On the other hand, as argued by MMT, multilateral 
trade openness would  also help compensate for the loss of consumpti on goods production in 
conflicting countries. Some countries, which depend relatively more on international markets or 
third countries would have less incentive to avoid a war with bilateral partners. Therefore, the 
prediction that globalization decreases a probability of conflict derives from the assumption that 
the effect of direct welfare loss from increasing multilateral trade costs  by bilateral conflict 
outweighs  the welfare gain from the role of multilateral trade as a potential substitute for 
bilateral trade flows. This implies relatively high values of  multi  , low  , and a high  .  





 multi  and predicts that a high level of multilateral 
trade has a positive impact on the probability of conflict.  MMT argues that multilateral trade 
openness reduces bilateral dependence on any given country and thus lowers the opportunity cost 
of military conflict. Their model assumes that a bilateral military conflict b etween countries 
destroys a substantial part of  the combatants‘ ―effective labor‖ —high  . They further assume 
that the increase in multilateral trade costs following a conflict is relatively small—low  multi  .  
However, in most small-scale bilateral military conflicts—where there is merely a display 
of force or the threat of force—the loss of either effective labor or domestic production would be 
small relative to the increase in multilateral trade costs.
 9 Also, multilateral trade costs often 
increase significantly if borders are closed during a military conflict.  
                                                 
9 In the model, the effective labor force equals total expenditure. We try to estimate λ as the growth rate of GDP at 
the time a conflict begins, and τmulti as the growth rate of multilateral trade flows during the conflict. The following 
table displays the mean growth rate of GDP and multilateral trade of countries who underwent MID(over hostility 
level 4).  
  The mean growth of GDP(-λ) of country pairs  The mean growth of multilateral trade flow(-τ) 
Conflict at t  -0.123(%)  -3.690(%) 
Conflict at t-1  -5.024(%)  -8.782(%)  
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Moreover, a war provoked by a state against one trading partner can lead to a reaction 
from one or more other trading partners, which means  multi  can be large. As long as other trading 
partners in global markets prefer to do business with a ―peaceful‖ partner, a dyadic conflict 
would hurt the dyad‘s trade with global partners. This suggests that global trade openness of the 
dyad can in fact reduce the incentive to provoke a bilateral conflict. Figure 1 shows the change of 
bilateral and multilateral trade flows of eight warring dyads before, during, and after the conflict 
between them. The bilateral conflicts between countries were typically followed by a decrease, 
not only in bilateral trade flows, but also in multilateral trade (the long term trend of multilateral 
trade is plotted in red). During military conflicts, multilateral trade declined quite noticeably in 
both states. In terms of post-conflict multilateral trade, the state that lost the war—as judged by 
international  perception—suffered  a  more  significant  decline.  While  this  data  are  merely 
suggestive, we will use more formal empirical analysis to assess the effects military conflict has 
on multilateral trade (see Section 5). 
 
2.2. Geographic Proximity and the Peace-promotion Effect 
We show that bilateral trade and global trade integration can have a significant impact on 
peace.  In  addition,  the  peace-promotion  effect  of  trade  can  vary  depending  on  geographic 
proximity between dyads of states.  
First,  a  war  might  have  a  more  disastrous  impact  on  neighboring  states  than  those 
geographically distant, which means that the size of reduction in domestic production ( ) and 
increase  in  bilateral  trade  cost  by  conflict  ( bil  )  are  negatively  associated  with the  distance 
between dyads of state in conflict, i and  j ,  ) (
) (
 ij d    and  bil  = ) (
) (
ij bil d  . One would expect that 
there would be less damage to domestic production the more distant the two countries in conflict. 
It  is  also  plausible  that  geographically  distant  countries in  conflict  find smaller  increases  in 
bilateral trade costs.
10   
                                                                                                                                                             
Therefore, we conjecture that τmulti is greater than λ. With differed lags of conflicts, λ and τmulti still have very similar 
absolute values. If we consider the value for elasticity of substitution (σ) ranging 8-12, τmulti should be larger than λ 
/(σ-1). 
10 Suppose that countries underwent the same amount of increase in trade cost due to a conflict. The percent change 
in bilateral trade costs between distant countries in conflict is relatively lower than those of countries geographically 
closer, particularly if more distant countries have relatively higher trade costs than those geographically proximate.  
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In equation (7), when the bilateral cost of conflict ( bil  ) decreases with bilateral distance, 




 ) Pr( )  becomes  larger  for  geographically 
proximate  countries.  Therefore,  the  peace-promotion  effect  of  trade  is  much  higher  for 
neighboring countries than it is for geographically distant nations.  
On the contrary, in equation (8), when the production loss of conflict ( ) decreases with 




 ) Pr( ) becomes smaller for 
geographically proximate countries. Hence, an increase in multilateral trade openness tends to 
reduce the probability of conflict more for distant nations than it does for neighboring countries. 
On the other hand, given the welfare loss (L), the probability that a dispute escalates into 




 in equation (1)—can be different. If interstate 
economic and political relations tend to be more important for neighboring countries, countries 
closer geographically would be more inclined to prevent disputes from escalating into military 




 increases  with  bilateral  distance  in 
equations (7) and (8). In that case, greater bilateral and global trade interdependence can be more 
helpful in promoting peace for geographically proximate countries.  
 
 
3.  Empirical Specification and Data  
We investigate the impact of trade integration (bilateral and global) on military conflict 
based on regression equations utilizing panel data of dyadic observations from 1950 to 2000: 
 
ijt t ijt ijt ijt ijt u Year X openness trade Global openness trade Bilateral MID                2 1     (9) 
 
where: the dependent variable,  MIDijt, equals unity if states i and j are engaged in a military 
conflict against each other at time t and equals zero otherwise; Bilateral trade opennessijt is a 
measure of bilateral trade interdependence between the dyad of states i and j at time t; Global 
trade opennessijt is a measure of trade dependence of the dyad on global markets (except the  
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bilateral  partner),  the  vector  Xijt  comprises  the  other  important  determinants  of  interstate 
conflicts; and Yeart denotes a set of binary variables that are unity in year t. 
The measure of military conflict is constructed from the database of the ―Correlates of 
War (COW)‖ project.
11 This data set codes all Military Interstate Disputes (MID) with a level of 
hostility ranging from 1 to 5 (1= no militarized action, 2= threat to use force, 3= display of force, 
4= use of force, 5= war).
12 The MID dataset (version 3.02) is transformed to dyadic events with 
corrections made by Zeev Maoz (Maoz, 2005).
13 
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the data set. In the sample of 572,246 dyadic 
observations from 1950 to 2000, MID events of levels 3, 4, and 5 total 2,286, out of which wars 
of hostility level 5 comprise only 264.
14  
Our sample for regressions is restricted because of the limited availability of explanatory 
variables. In the sample of 243,225 observations, MID events of levels 3, 4, and 5 total 1,246, 
with 50 wars. For our measure of the dependent variable, we use the concept of military  
conflicts—comprising MID events of hostility levels 3, 4, and 5 only.
15 The indicator used to 
                                                 
11  http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ 
12 The COW project collected historical militarized incidents and categorized each military dispute into 5 hostility 
levels according to the magnitude of each type of military action. Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996) provide how to 
categorize each dispute. First, the ‗threat to use force‘ (level 2) is defined as ―verbal indications of hostile intent.‖ 
Second, the ‗display of force‘ (level 3) includes alerting with armed forces and nuclear forces, purposely displaying 
troops, planes and ships outside the territory of a targeted state, fortifying the border and so on. Jones et al. (1996) 
mention that the ―displays of force involve military demonstrations but no combat interaction.‖ Third, the ‗use of 
military force‘ (level 4) indicates the common active military operation such as blockades, clashes, occupation of 
territory, which, by the nature of the action, have a direct effect on the receiving state. Lastly, the ‗war‘ (level 5) is 
defined as a military combat in which there are a minimum of 1,000 total battle deaths (For the detailed definition 
and coding rule, see Jones, Bremer and Singer, 1996). 
13 The data set and codebook are available from ( http://psfaculty.ucdavis.edu/zmaoz/dyadmid.html). In fact, the 
existing versions of COW dataset do not provide the dyadic level of disputes: The dataset  that is available(either on 
the PSSI website or the EUGENE website) consists of two types of observations: (i) dispute level, which  provides 
general information about the military dispute such as its name, the number of participants, starting and end dates, 
and hostility level, (ii) individual part icipants level, which  includes information on each dispute participant —the 
disputes in which they are engaged, the hostility level, the entry and exit dates from disputes, and which side they 
support. Therefore, generating bilateral and multilateral disputes for dyads with these two types of observations is 
necessary for analyzing the effect of interstate relations on disputes. However, combining these data for making 
multilateral disputes may cause a large number of errors—miscoding country pairs involved in the military conflict, 
reporting inaccurate levels of hostility, and so on—so that this combination needs to be carefully performed. Zeev 
Maoz corrected possible procedural errors and generated a MID dyadic dataset that is widely used in recent political 
science and economic research (see the details in Maoz 2005).     
14 We adopt a skewed logit regression to control for this skewed distribution of the dependent variable for the 
robustness check of the empirical results in section 4.4. 
15 In general, trade and peace researches in political science use  MID events  ranging from 2 to 5 as dependent 
variables (Oneal and Russett  1999 and Gartzke and Li  2003). They seem to consider any international political 
tension that could be caused by trade and democracy.  MMT (2008) uses MID events of levels 3, 4 and 5. The 
regressions in the next sections show qualitatively similar results when MID events of levels 2, 3, 4, and 5 are used.   
 
13 
capture bilateral trade interdependence is the geometric average of bilateral trade flows over 
GDP of two countries. For global trade openness, we use the geometric average of total trade 
(excluding their bilateral trade flows) over GDP of two countries. Data on trade measured in 
current  US  dollars  for  1948–2000  are  from  Gleditsch  (2002),
16 which  originate  from  the 
International Monetary Fund‘s (IMF) Direction of Trade database and other sources. Data on 
GDP in current US dollars are from IMF, International Financial Statistics and, Barbieri (2002) 
Dataset
17 for 1950–1965, and World Bank, World Development Indicators for 1965–2000. We 
use values lagged 2 years to limit simultaneity problems.  
The specification also controls the other important determinants of interstate conflicts 
that are identified by previous literature. These control variables include geographical proximity, 
relative  military  power,  and  political,  historical,  and  cultural  factors.
18 Military conflicts are 
expected to occur more often between neighboring countries because they are more likely to be 
engaged in disputes and they can mobilize military resources against each other more quickly. 
To  measure  geographical proximity, we use two variables —(i)  the  log  of  bilateral  distance 
between countries and (ii) a binary variable for contiguity (by land and by sea up to 150 miles) 
between them. These variables are from the COW database.  
Relative military capabilities between states have a significant impact on the probability 
of military conflict. But it is not clear in theory whether power preponderance or power balance 
is more conducive to peace. Empirical studies also provide controversial views that states more 
equally balanced in military power are less inclined to engage in military conflict (Siverson and 
Tennefoss, 1984), preponderance power is more peaceful (Kim, 1991), or distribution of power 
has no significant effect on peace (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1988). To measure national 
capabilities,  we  use  the  COW  military  capabilities  index  (version  3.02)  composed  (in  equal 
weights)  of  a  country‘s  share  of  the  system‘s  total  population,  urban  population,  energy 
consumption, iron and steel production, military manpower, and military expenditures (Singer 
1987). The relative military capability ratio is made by taking a logarithm of the ratio of the 
higher state‘s capability index to that of the lower index in each dyad. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) use only level 4 and 5 events for analyzing the effects of a genetic distance on 
interstate wars. The choice of dependent variable may vary subjectively due to the purpose of the research. 
16  http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/exptradegdp.html 
17  http://people.cas.sc.edu/barbierk/databases.html 
18 A recent paper by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) investigates the link between human‘s genetic distance and the 
occurrence of interstate conflicts.  They find that genetically closer populations are more likely to make a war with 
each other because the populations have shared a more common history and issues of interest over which they fight.   
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In  addition,  the  role  of  ―major  power‖  countries  is  considered.  States  with  strongest 
military power are more likely to undertake military action against less powerful states to exploit 
concession, or to interfere and mediate conflicts in the world. A binary variable for a group of 
major power countries is added for the five permanent United Nations (UN) Security Council 
members—People‘s  Republic  of  China,  France,  United  Kingdom,  United  States,  and  USSR 
(Russia Federation). 
Political factors that affect the probability of military conflict include characteristics of 
political institutions such as democracy. In political science literature, including those of the 
―liberal peace‖ view, nations with higher levels of democracy are less likely to engage in war. 
The democratic process necessitates more discussion and majority support from the public and 
the legislature in making major decisions such as war (Dixon 1993, and Oneal et al. 1997). For 
measurement, an index for joint democracy is used (Bremer, 1993). The raw data is from Polity 
IV database,
19 which assesses each country‘s level of democracy ranging from full autocracy (-
10), to full democracy (+10). The joint democracy variable is constructed by multiplying two 
countries‘ indexes and then rescaling them to range from 0 to 1, with unity indicating dyads with 
two full democracies.  
Political  proximity  between  two  countries  can  be  a  possible  determinant  of  military 
conflict. It is the ―affinity of nations‖ index (Gartzke, 2000), which is constructed by using UN 
voting data.
20 It is assumed that the  more UN voting patterns of two nations are alike, their 
political interests would be more similar. The index ranges from -1 (most dissimilar) to 1 (most 
similar). It is expected that countries that share similar political interests are less likely to engage 
in military conflicts. We also include a binary variable for the presence of formal security 
alliances for dyads. This variable comes from the COW database. 
Cultural and religious factors are often argued as the root cause of interstate conflict. In 
his  book,  The  Clash  of  Civilizations  and  the  Remaking  of  World  Order  (1996),  Samuel 
Huntington  argues  that  in  the post-Cold  War world,  conflicts  between  different civilizations 
increasingly replaced those of differing ideologies. Religious difference often leads to interstate 
                                                 
19 The Polity IV Project (Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2004), under the direction of Monty 
G.  Marshall  at  George  Mason  University,  carries  data  and  analysis  through  2006 
(http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data). 
20 We use data on UN roll-call votes on resolution in the United Nations General Assembly collected by Erik Voeten 
(http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ev42/UNvoting.htm).  Barro  and  Lee  (2005)  used  the  UN  voting  data  to 
investigate the influence of the US and major powers on IMF lending decisions.   
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conflict due to fundamentalism and ―securitization of faith‖ (Lausten and Wæver, 2000). Recent 
conflicts such as the US-Iraq war and the Kosovo conflict support these arguments. Several 
empirical studies investigate the relationship between religious similarity and interstate conflict 
and  provide  mixed  results.  Early  studies  by  Henderson  (1997,  1998)  show  that  religious 
similarity tends to reduce the frequency of interstate wars. In contrast, Russet et al. (2000) and 
Chiozza  (2002)  find  civilization  differences  do  not  have  a  significant  impact  on  interstate 
militarized disputes.  
While these previous studies adopt a measure of religious similarity based on detailed 
religion  categories,  we  construct  a  new  measure  of  religious  similarity  between  dyads  by 
focusing on nine major religions (k=Catholic, Protestant, Other Christianity, Orthodox, Islam, 





RR    
where 
k
i R  and 
k
j R denote  the  fraction  of  the  religion k  in  the  population  of  country  i  and  j 
respectively.
21 The index is similar to the ‗S‘ index (Signorino and Ritter, 1999) or the ‗affinity 
of nations‘ index (Gartzke, 2000) and measures the extent to which two countries share the same 
religious affiliations. It ranges between -1 (most dissimilar) and 1 (most similar). The raw data 
comes from Barrett (1982) and Barrett et al. (2001)
 22 and Barro (2006). By considering only the 
nine  major  religions,  we  assume  that  the  differences  in  nonreligious  and  other  religion 
populations do not influence conflicts between states. Moreover, we add an index for common 
language and a dummy variable for country pairs with a history of colonialization and for a 
common  colonizer  to  control  for  cultural  and/or  historical  factors  that  might  affect  the 
occurrence of conflicts.  
The specification also considers the impact of natural resource endowment on interstate 
conflict  by including an oil-exporter dummy variable. The argument  that conflicts  are often 
                                                 
21 Guiso et al.(2005), and Helpman et al.(2008) also consider only major religions in constructing a measure of 
religious similarity. But their measure is constructed by adding up the multiplications of two countries‘ population 
shares across each religion category. Hence, the index ranges from 0 (most dissimilar) and 1 (most similar). This 
measure is problematic because, for instance, for a majority of dyads consisting of a country that has very small 
population shares in all four major religions, it has a value always very close to 0 (most dissimilar) regardless of the 
religions in the other country, predicting counter-intuitively that the dyads are most likely to engage in interstate 
conflict (as much as other dyads in which two countries are completely different in major religions). In contrast, our 
measure will have different values based on the degree of similarity between dyads in nine categories.  
22 http://worldchristiandatabase.org/wcd/default.asp   
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linked by control over ownership of resources or the means to access and to market them (such 
as trade routes) has a long history—since the era of mercantilism and colonialism. In particular, 
energy resources such as oil have been a major cause of interstate conflict, for example, the 
1980–1988 Iran-Iraq war (Klare, 2001). The oil-exporter dummy is 1 if one of the dyads belongs 
to OPEC. Oil-net exporters are likely to be exposed to more conflicts involving their resources. 
In order to consider the effect of economic institution on conflicts, the specification also 
has  a  preferential  trade  area—Free  Trade  Agreement  (FTA)  and  Regional  Trade  Agreement 
(RTA)—dummy, a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to the same FTA/RTA. The 
FTA/RTA data comes from MMT (2008). Moreover, either or both GATT membership dummy 
as coded 1 if either country of dyads is in GATT or two countries are both GATT signatories 
during the observation year (t).  
We also control the possible spillover effects of military conflicts in the specification. 
The existence of other conflicts can simultaneously influence both an occurrence of a bilateral 
military conflict and bilateral trade flows between a dyad of states. In addition, we include a zero 
trade dummy for all country pairs for which there was no trade between them to control, whether 
or not the two countries have an economic relationship.  
The regression includes the number of peace years as an additional variable. Previous 
studies also include the number of peace years (since the last MID) variable to the regression to 
control ―temporal dependence‖ between conflict events (Beck et al, 1998). An occurrence of a 
military conflict not only can have an immediate impact on bilateral trade, but can also influence 
the probability of military conflicts at any future moment. The temporal dependence problem 
indicates  an  auto-correlated  binary  dependent  variable  that  can  mislead  the  result  of  logit 
analysis.  For  instance,  military  conflicts,  which  can  last  more  than  a  year,  can  occur  with 
different probabilities if they run in succession. Beck et al. (1998) propose a solution: for this 
persistence of a dependent variable, they include cubic splines of peace years in the regression to 
control the temporal dependence. We also include cubic splines of the number of peace years in 
the regressions to further control for the potential ―temporal dependence‖ problem.
23  
Lastly, the regression includes time dummies to control for common effects of external 
                                                 
23 The qualitative results are similar with or without this additional variable. Beck et al.(1998) suggest to add cubic 
splines of the number of peace years, as well as the number of peace years variable, to  correct for a temporal 
dependence bias. The other solution is to include a dummy variable, ( 1,2,...) Kt t   which is coded as unity according to 
the length (t) of sequence of zeros that precede the current observations. This is exactly the same as including every 
lagged conflict (dependent) variable.  
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factors such as the end of the Cold War. The variable uijt is a random error term. All time-varying 
variables are lagged by 2 years to limit simultaneity problems. The data set has a feature of panel 
structure consisting of 243,225 annual observations clustered by 11,195 country pair groups from 
1950 to 2000. The number of observations varies by year. Because a conflict is a binary-choice 
variable, we use pooled logit model to explain the variable. To estimate these systems, we allow 
for clustering for common country-pair observations of the error terms over time. 
Table  2  reports  the  top  15  countries  that  were  most  frequently  involved  in  military 
interstate dispute (MID) events from 1950 to 2000. The top three countries—US, Russia (USSR 
and Russian Federation), and PRC—belong to the ―major power‖ category. The other two major 
powers are ranked 11
th (United Kingdom) and 15






th), and Egypt (10
th). They have been 
involved in more conflicts because of religious differences, resources, and geopolitical factors. 
India and Pakistan, which differ in major religion and are embroiled in a dispute over Kashmir, 
rank 7
th and 13
th respectively. Thailand (12
th) and Korea (tied with Pakistan for 13
th) are also 
involved in many conflicts, mostly with adjacent countries. The top 15 countries participated in 
813 out of 1,458 total MIDs during the period. The table shows that geopolitical factors, major 
power, religion, and oil exports are important factors for military conflicts.  
Summary statistics for the entire data used in the estimation are presented in column (1) 
in Table 3. Of all the observations in the sample, 1,246 country-pairs (about 0.51%) belong to a 
conflict and 241,979 (about 99.49%) to non-conflict or peace. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 
report summary statistics for each sub-sample. 
In Table 3, we observe that conflicts have been more frequent among dyads of states 
sharing a common land border or are geographically closer. The mean of contiguity index (the 
logarithmic distance) is higher (smaller) in column (2) than that in column (1). The mean of 
(lagged) bilateral trade interdependence measure in column (2) is three times higher than that in 
column (1), indicating that the bilateral trade between dyads in conflict is much higher than the 
average bilateral trade in the entire sample. On the other hand, the mean of (lagged) global trade 
openness measure in column (2) is slightly smaller than that in column (1), which implies that 
conflicts have occurred more frequently among dyads of states relatively more open with each 
other but less open to the global economy. This casual observation does not imply that greater 
bilateral trade interdependence or lesser global trade openness leads to more conflict between  
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dyads. When the relationship between each variable and conflict is discussed, the other variables 
should be appropriately controlled. For example, the shorter distance between dyads in conflict 
naturally leads to greater bilateral trade interdependence and smaller global trade openness.    
Our specification assumes that the impact of bilateral or global trade openness on the 
probability of military conflict is the same for all country pairs independent of other country-pair 
characteristics. But trade patterns (bilateral and global trade openness) may affect the probability 
of military conflict differently for different subsets of countries, depending in particular on the 
geographical distance between them. As discussed in section 2, an increase in bilateral trade 
integration  may  decrease  the  probability  of  conflict  more  significantly  between  neighboring 
states, whereas an increase in global trade integration can decrease the probability of conflict 
more significantly between geographically distant states. In order to test this predication, the 
basic specification (9) can be extended by including the interaction terms of trade variables with 
bilateral distance or contiguity variables:  
 
(9.1) 
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4.  Empirical Results 
 
4.1. Basic Results 
Table 4 presents estimation results for the logit model for the probability of conflict. 
Consider first the results in columns (1)–(3). Column (1) includes bilateral trade interdependence 
variable. Column (2) substitutes the global trade openness for the bilateral trade interdependence. 
Column (3) includes both of these trade integration variables.  
Column (1) of Table 4 shows that the model fits the data well, explaining a substantial 
part of the variation in the occurrence of military conflict. Contiguity, bilateral distance, relative 
military capabilities, major-powers, joint-democracy, UN voting, oil-exporters, FTA/RTA and 
both GATT members dummy variables are individually significant at the 1% critical level. The 
significantly  negative  estimated  coefficient  for  the  bilateral  distance  and  the  significantly  
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positive one for contiguity explain that geographically proximate countries are more likely to 
engage  in  military  conflict.  The  negative  estimate  for  the  relative  military  capability  ratio 
supports the contention that states unequally balanced in military capability are less likely to 
engage in military conflict. On the other hand, the positive estimated coefficient on major-power 
variable  explains  that  these  countries  tend  to  fight  more.  The  negative  estimate  for  joint 
democracy confirms that the probability of military conflicts is significantly lower for dyads 
composed of states that are more democratic. The positive estimate for oil exporters means that 
oil exporters are involved with military conflicts more frequently. The estimated coefficient of 
FTA/RTA  dummy  is  negative  that  countries  in  the  same  FTA/RTA  blocs  are  less  prone  to 
provoke military conflicts. 
In column (1), the estimated coefficient on bilateral trade interdependence is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% critical level (-8.968, s.e.=4.487), indicating that bilateral trade 
dependence significantly decreases the probability of military conflicts. Most importantly, this 
estimation result holds true with all other important controlled variables. For instance, distance 
negatively affects both bilateral trade and conflict probability.
24  
In column (2) of Table 4, the estimated coefficient on global trade openness is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% critical level ( -1.692, s.e.=0.427). Dyads of states more 
dependent on the world economy tend to have fewer conflicts than those less dependent. Hence, 
this result contrasts  with that of MMT, in which countries more open to global trade have a 
higher probability of war. Our finding holds quite robust, whereas that of MMT do es not, in the 
larger sample or more controlling variables as discussed later. As our specification includes a 
time dummy variable separately, this significant coefficient may not be caused by global factors 
such as the end of Cold War or peace -promotion efforts of international organizations that are 
common to all countries.  
In column (3) of Table 4, in which both global trade openness and bilateral trade 
interdependence are included, global trade openness has individually significantly negative 
effects at the 1% critical level (-1.661, s.e.=0.429). The estimated coefficient on bilateral trade 
interdependence  is  negative,  but  turns  out  be  slightly  insignificant.  Broadly  speaking,  the 
                                                 
24 The omission of distance in the regression yields a biased (toward a positive value) estimate of the impact of 
bilateral trade interdependence on conflict. A positive estimate of the impact of bilateral trade interdependence on 
conflicts—often obtained by several researchers, such as Barbieri (1996) and Barbieri and Peters (2003)—can be 
attributed to this bias.   
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findings of columns (1), (2), and (3) suggest that both bilateral and global trade dependence 
promote peace between bilateral trade partners.  
 
4.2. Quantification and methodological issues 
In  the  logit  model,  the  dependent  variable  is  defined  as  the  log-odds  ratio  and  the 
parameters do not correspond to the marginal effects of independent variables. The marginal 
effects  can  be  calculated  at  the  means  of  regressors  by  using  the  estimate.
25 Then, we can 
compute the response of the probability of military conflict to a one -standard-deviation change 
of each explanatory variable, gau ging the relative importance of each explanatory variable in 
influencing the probability of military conflict. 
For  example,  based  on  column  (3)  of  Table  4,  an  increase  in  the  bilateral  trade 
dependence by one standard deviation of 0.007 (starting from the  sample mean) decreases the 
probability of military conflict by 0.00 3 percentage point, with other variables held constant. 
This implies that if bilateral trade volume increases 10% from the world mean value, the  mean 
probability of military conflict between the two trading partners decreases by about 0.16% from 
its predicted mean probability of conflict evaluated at the means of explanatory variables. On the 
other hand, an increase in the global trade openness (by one standard deviation, or 0.370) 
decreases  the  probability  of  military  conflict  by  0.03 7  percentage  point,  other  variables 
remaining constant. This implies that an increase in global trade openness by 10% from the 
world mean value decreases the probability of the dyad's military conflict by about  7.7 % from 
its predicted mean of conflict  evaluated at the means of explanatory variables . Hence, global 
trade openness, compared with bilateral trade dependence, has a relatively large impact on the 
probability of conflict with the bilateral trading partner.  
Geographic proximity also has a large impact on the probability of military conflict. An 
increase in the log of bilateral distance by 0.829 (its standard deviation) is associated with a 
decrease of the likelihood that a pair of countries is engaged in  a conflict by 0.021 percentage 
point. Because the contiguity variable is an indicator variable, its marginal impact is calculated 
for its change from 0 (no common land or distant by sea above 150 miles) to 1 (common border 
                                                 
25 The log of odds ratio is 
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or distant by sea up to 150 miles). The corresponding response to this change is an increase in 
the probability of military conflict by 0.443 percentage point. Hence, the probability of a military 
conflict is substantially higher for contiguous countries.  
An increase in the relative military capability ratio (by one standard deviation or 1.694) 
generates a decrease in the probability of conflict by 0.023 percentage point. The corresponding 
response to an increase in the joint-democracy index (by one standard deviation or 0.336) is a 
decrease in the probability of military conflict by 0.022 percentage point. The marginal impact of 
religious similarity (by one standard deviation or 0.577) decreases the probability of conflict by 
0.01 percentage point.   
The  marginal  impacts  of  the  major-powers,  oil-exporters  and  FTA/RTA  variables 
correspond to the change of these dummy variables from 0 to 1. The probability of military 
conflict  increases  by  0.231  percentage  point  responding  to  the  change  in  the  major-power 
variable and by 0.049 percentage point when at least one of dyads is an oil exporter. Hence, the 
probability of military conflict is substantially higher between dyads involving a major power. 
The impact of dyads belonging to the same FTA/RTA(from 0 to 1) decrease the probability of 
conflict by 0.033 percentage point, which means joining a preferential trade area decreases the 
probability of military conflicts with other entries by about 6.7% from its predicted mean of 
conflict. 
The empirical technique used assumes that there is no unobserved country-specific factor. 
When random-effects models are adopted to control country–specific factors, we obtain similar 
results, although the bilateral trade interdependence becomes less statistically significant. These 
results  are  not  emphasized  here  because  the  conditions  needed  for  the  satisfactory 
implementation of random-effects logit models seem unlikely to hold (Wooldridge, 2001). 
We have also adopted the ―conditional‖ fixed-effects logit estimation technique which 
controls for unobserved country-pair fixed effects. The estimated results do not provide any 
significant predictions for the impact of trade integration on conflict.
26 Although fixed-effects 
estimation  is  often  preferred  by  many  researchers,  the  fixed -effects  technique  also  has 
drawbacks. Because the fixed-effect estimator exploits only the variation over time, the estimates 
for  time-invariant  factors such as  distance,  contiguity,  oil -exporters,  major  power dummy, 
common  language,  and  colonial  relationship  cannot  be  obtained.  By  eliminating  entire 
                                                 
26 Results of fixed logit and fixed linear probability (FE LPM) model are available from the authors upon request.  
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information  from  cross-section variations,  the estimation  relies  on a smaller information  set, 
which the regression sample shrinks to only 12,828. In addition, it may exacerbate the bias due 
to measurement errors in variables.  
 
4.3. Peace-promotion effect depending on geographical proximity 
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 present the results from estimation of specification (9.1) 
to test whether the impact of bilateral or global trade openness on the probability of military 
conflict depends on bilateral distance or contiguity between dyads.  
First,  two  interaction  terms  of  bilateral  distance  with  the  bilateral  and  global  trade 
integration  variables  are  introduced  to  the  regression.  The  estimated  result  in  column  (4) 
confirms that the impact of bilateral trade openness varies depending on the distance between 
countries. While the estimated coefficient on bilateral trade dependence, (-82.594 s.e.=24.514) is 
negative and statistically significant, the estimated coefficient on the interactive term between 
bilateral  trade  interdependence  and  distance  (11.789,  s.e.=3.03)  is  positive  and  statistically 
significant. These two estimates combined suggest that the closer two countries are, the greater is 
the peace-promotion effect from an increase in bilateral trade. In fact, the overall marginal effect 
of bilateral trade interdependence on the probability of military conflict is negative between 
proximate  countries  and  then  positive  between  distant  ones.  The  two  estimated  coefficients 
imply that the switch occurs at log of bilateral distance of 7.01 (=1108 km), which is below the 
sample  median  of  8.77  (=6438  km).  The  strong  negative  relation  between  bilateral  trade 
interdependence and the probability of military conflict in dyads with smaller bilateral distance 
seems  to  support  the  argument  that  greater  bilateral  trade  interdependence  can  help  prevent 
disputes—especially between geographically closer states—from being escalated into military 
conflicts.  
However,  the  positive  relation  between  bilateral  trade  interdependence  and  the 
probability of military conflict in the upper range of bilateral distance is puzzling. This may 
reflect that the strong bilateral trade between distant states often comes from more asymmetric 
trade  links,  which  is  often  related  to  exploitation  and  economic  conflicts,  leading  to  more 
military conflicts between them.  
The estimation result in column (4) also confirms that the impact of global trade openness 
varies depending on the distance between countries. The estimated coefficient on the interactive  
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term between global trade openness and distance (-0.42, s.e.=0.171) is significantly negative at 
the 5% critical level, while the estimated coefficient on global trade openness, (1.963, s.e.= 
1.195), is positive but insignificant.
 The two point estimates for global trade and its interaction 
terms  imply  that  the  overall  marginal  effect  of  global  trade  openness  on  the  probability  of 
military conflict is negative for almost entire range of the sample. Only for the countries where 
bilateral distance ranges below 4.67 (=107 km), which is less than 0.05% of the dyads in the 
sample,  the  marginal  impact  of  global  trade  openness  can  be  positive.
27 The strong peace-
promotion effect of global trade openness for all country pairs regardless of their geographical  
distance contrasts the negative relation between bilateral trade dependence and peace for the 
group of geographically distant country pairs. 
The significantly negative interactive term between global trade openness and distance 
indicates that the peace-promotion impact of global trade openness is higher for geographically 
distant countries. An increase in global trade openness likely decreases the probability of conflict 
less for proximate countries than for distant countries. This may reflect that greater  global trade 
integration can be more helpful to promote peace for dyads of distant countries, for which the 
opportunity cost of war that derives from increased cost or loss of production can be relatively 
lower than those geographically closer.  
In  Figure  2,  we  quantify  the peace -promotion  effects  of  bilateral  and  global  trade 
integration using our estimation result in column (4) of Table 4. We separate the sample into 
three country-pair groups depending on their bilateral distance; within 200 km, between 200 and 
7000 km, and more than 7000  km. Then, we simulate the effect of changes in bilateral and 
multilateral trade openness on the predicted mean probability of conflict, holding other variables 
constant. We explore, for instance, what happens if bilatera l and multilateral trade openness 
decrease by 10% from their mean. 
Results are shown in Figure 2. In the panels (a), (b) and (c)  of Figure 2, the first bar 
indicates the baseline mean probability of a military conflict for each group. In the first bar of 
Figure 2 (a), the baseline mean probability of a military conflict is 13.13% for the country pairs 
located within 200km of each other. In the second bar in Figure 2 (a), we simulate the effect of a 
                                                 
27 This threshold distance that changes the sign of the coefficient of multilateral openness on conflict, 4.75(=115km), 
is smaller than MMT‘s threshold distance, 8.04(=3000 km), of base specification, column (4) of Table 3 of MMT. A 
higher distance threshold in MMT might be caused by an ―omitted variable‖ problem. See the discussion in the 
section 4.6.    
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10%  decrease  in  bilateral  trade  dependence  on  the  mean  probability  of  conflict.  The  mean 
probability of a military conflict is predicted to increase to 13.39%, an increase of around 1.98%. 
The third bar in Figure 2 (a) shows the effect of a decrease in multilateral trade openness on the 
mean probability of a conflict. A 10% decrease in multilateral openness reduces the predicted 
mean probability of a conflict to 13.04%. This negative impact of multilateral openness on peace 
supports the MMT's finding. However, it occurs only in the small sample of countries that are 
separated by less than 200 km. The sample includes only 19 pairs, which constitutes 0.08% of 
the total observations.
28 The effect of a 10% decrease in both bilateral and multilateral openness 
is depicted in the fourth bar. The mean probability of conflict increases to 13.29% as the effect of 
a decrease in bilateral openness on conflict dominates the effect of multilateral openness. 
The panels (b) and (c) of Figure 2 present the results of the similar simulation exercises 
for the other two groups. The baseline mean probability of military conflicts are 0.7794% for the 
country-pair group with a bilateral distance between 200 and 7000 km and 0.193%  for the group 
with a bilateral distance larger than 7000  km, which shows the mean probability of conflicts 
decrease with bilateral distance. A 10% decrease in multilateral trade openness increases the 
predicted mean probability of military conflicts from 0.7794% to 0.7862%, an increase of around 
0.87%, in the panel (b), and from 0.193% to 0.1934%, an increase of around 0.21%, in the panel 
(c).
29 Hence, an increase in multilateral trade openness has peace -promotion effect for country-
pairs in the intermediate and long distance samples of the country-pairs with a bilateral distance 
larger than 200 km (which is 99.92% of the total observations). The result confirms that global 
trade  integration  generally  promotes  peace.  This  contrasts  the  overall  positive  impact  of 
multilateral openness on military conflicts of MMT (see Figure 6 of MMT, 2008).  
In Figure 2 (b), a 10% decr ease in bilateral trade dependence also increases the mean 
probability of military conflicts for countries with a bilateral distance between 200 and 7000 km. 
On the contrary,  in Figure 2 (c),  a decrease in bilateral trade dependence reduces the mean 
probability of military conflicts for countries farther than 7000 km apart.   
                                                 
28 The threshold of distance that changes the sign of the coefficient of multilateral openness on conflict is 4.75 (=115 
km) 
29 In this case, we simulate the effect of unilateral 10% decrease in multilateral openness from its mean regardless of 
standard deviation (s.d.) of sub-sample. Thus, the peace promotion effect of multilateral openness turns out to be 
larger for countries between 200 and 7000 km than those more than 7000 km apart. However, when we consider one 
s.d. change from the mean of each sub -sample, the peace-promotion effect becomes larger for countries more 
distant.   
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In  order  to  confirm  the  validity  of  quantifying  the  peace-promotion  effect  of  trade 
integration depending on geographical proximity, we also use contiguity variable as a different 
geographic  proximity  measure  for  the  interaction  terms  with  both  trade  openness  measures. 
Column  (5)  of  Table  4  introduces  the  interaction  terms  of  the  bilateral  and  global  trade 
integration  variables  with  contiguity  by  substituting  for  their  interaction  terms  with  bilateral 
distance. The estimated coefficient on bilateral trade interdependence, (23.919, s.e.=4.638) is 
significantly positive and the estimated coefficient on the interactive term between bilateral trade 
dependence and contiguity (-34.552, s.e.= 6.246) is significantly negative. 
Hence,  the  overall  effect  of  bilateral  trade  dependence  on  the  probability  of  military 
conflict hinges on contiguity. The peace-promotion effect of bilateral trade dependence appears 
to be significantly higher for contiguous countries. But, the estimates indicate that the relation 
between bilateral trade dependence and the probability of military conflict can be positive in 
non-contiguous countries, which is consistent with the result in column (4).  
On the other hand, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term between contiguity 
and  global  trade  openness  (1.192,  s.e.=0.585)  is  positive  and  significant.  The  estimated 
coefficient on global trade openness (-1.671, s.e.=0.548) is significantly negative. Hence, the two 
estimated coefficients imply that the overall marginal effect of global trade openness on the 
probability of military conflict is always negative for countries regardless of contiguity between 
them.  Greater  global  trade  integration  can  help  promote  peace  for  all  dyads,  which  is  also 
consistent with the result in column (4). 
Whether countries  are geographically contiguous or not, the pacifying effect of trade 
integration varies. The peace-promotion effect of bilateral trade integration is significantly higher 
for contiguous countries that are likely to experience more conflicts. For example, an increase of 
10% in bilateral trade volume of contiguous groups lowers the probability of military conflict 
between  two  contiguous  states  by  about  1%  from  the  predicted  mean  of  military  conflict 
evaluated at  the mean of explanatory variables, which the pacifying effect  of bilateral  trade 
integration is about 6.3 times for contiguous countries more than for all countries. 
Moreover, the peace-promotion effect of global trade openness is significantly higher for 
non-contiguous  countries  that  are  relatively  distant  from  each  other.  An  increase  of  10%  in 
multilateral trade volume of non-contiguous groups lowers the probability of military conflict 
between two non-contiguous states by about 8.8% from the predicted mean of military conflict  
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evaluated at the mean of variables. Thus, the results in columns (4) and (5) support the prediction 
of  our  conceptual  framework—equations  (7)  and  (8).  The  peace-promotion  effect  of  trade 
integration varies depending on the geographical proximity. 
 
4.4. Robustness of the Results 
We check for the robustness of the basic results of Table 4—about the effect of bilateral 
and global trade dependence on conflict.  
In order to minimize the simultaneous correlation problem between trade variables and 
military disputes, columns (1)–(3) of Table 5 present estimation results with 3-year lagged trade 
integration variables. The main results are similar to those in Table 4. But, the 3-year lagged 
bilateral trade interdependence variable becomes insignificant in column (1) of Table 5.   
We also investigated different trade integration measures, including the log of arithmetic 
averages,  rather  than  geometric  averages,  of  bilateral  or  global  trade  integration  of  the  two 
countries.
30 The estimation results of Columns (4)–(6) in Table 5 show that they are very similar 
to those in Tables 4.   
For the skewed binary dependent variable, we also use a skewed logit regression for the 
robustness. Nagler (1994) proposes ‗scobit‘ (skewed-logit) estimation as an alternative to the 
logit regression by allowing a skewed response curve with a skewness parameter in the density 
of the logit model. Under the probit and logit regression, it is automatically assumed that the 
maximal impact of any independent variable occurs when Pr[Dependent variable(y)=1 or 0] = 
0.5, in other words, that the probability distribution of a disturbance is symmetric. Thus, in our 
empirical analysis, logit and probit models might underestimate the sensitivity of going to war 
for a country with high war probability. However, when we use Nagler's skewed logit regression, 
the estimation results are both qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to those in Table 4.   
Conducting the accurate statistical inference is important for empirical research because 
wrong statistical inference (under-estimated S.E.) leads to over-rejection of the null hypothesis. 
We implement the Cameron et al. (2006) multi-way clustering method as well as one-way dyadic 
pair  clustering—to  determine  robust  standard  errors  of  the  results.  One-way  dyadic  pair 
clustering relies  on the distributional  assumptions;  errors  are independent  but  not  identically 
                                                 
30 To keep the zero observations when making the log transformation of bilateral trade dependence measure, we use 
log (1+x).   
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distributed across clustered pairs and can have general patterns of within cluster correlation and 
heteroskedasticity. However, each pair consists of two individual countries for which clustering 
needs to be accounted. For example, suppose there are two country pairs such as the US-France 
and the US-Korea. Dyadic pair clustering assumes errors of two pairs are orthogonal, but the US, 
a common country of pairs, affects that error terms of two pairs are correlated. In this case, the 
Cameron et al. (2006) two-way clustering is useful to infer robustness. We apply their method in 
our base regression, columns (1)-(5) of Table 4 and confirm that the S.E. hardly changes and the 
reported statistical inferences by one-way dyadic clustering are preserved.
31   
 
4.5. Instrument Variable Estimation 
The  empirical  investigation  of  the  effects  of  trade  integration  on  military  conflicts 
encounters  standard  endogeneity  problems.  The  causality  can  run  in  the  opposite  direction: 
military conflicts have a negative effect on trade (Glick and Taylor, 2005, Blomberg and Hess, 
2006, and MMT 2008). It is also plausible that the negative effects of trade may reflect any 
omitted  dyadic  characteristics  that  influence  the  probability  of  military  conflicts.  The  logit 
estimates may not therefore reveal the true effect of trade integration on military conflicts. We 
have used lagged trade variables to reduce endogeneity of trade as an explanation of military 
conflicts to the certain extent.  
In  this  section,  we  implement  an  instrument  variable  approach  to  control  potential 
endogeneity problems. We use as instrument variables the European Union Generalized System 
of  Preference  (GSP)  scheme  interacted  with  distance  and  an  index  of  economic  remoteness 
measure of dyads as suggested by MMT. However, we slightly change these two instrument 
variables  and  add  one  more  instrument  variable  for  effectively  controlling  endogeniety  and 
drawing the robust results.   
The Generalized System of Preference (GSP) scheme is tariff preferences granted by 
developed countries to developing countries. In 1968, UNCTAD recommended the creation of 
GSP  under  which  industrialized  countries  would  grant  autonomous  trade  preferences  to  all 
developing countries. Under GSP schemes, selected products originating in developing countries 
                                                 
31 The two-way clustering method is the following: first, obtain three different clustered robust ―variance‖ matrices 
for the estimator by one-way clustering in, respectively, the first country, the second country, and by the intersection 
of the first and second dimensions, and then add the first two variance matrices and subtract the third. The results of 
two-way clustering are available from authors upon request.   
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are granted reduced or zero tariff rates over the most favored nation (MFN) rates. Also, the least 
developed countries  (LDCs)  receive  preferential  treatment  for  a wide range of products  and 
deeper  tariff  cuts.  Romalis  (2003)  shows  that  GSP  program  increases  Least  Developed 
Countries‘ (LDC) trade significantly by facilitating LDC‘s access to markets of rich and distant 
developed  countries.  Therefore,  GSP  scheme  could  promote  increase  in  trade  of  beneficiary 
countries with preference-giving countries.  
There  are  currently  13  national  GSP  schemes.  The  following  countries  grant  GSP 
preferences: Australia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, the European Union (EU), Japan, 
New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey and the US. There are no 
specific political conditions for countries to be granted GSP, so that a country‘s participation in 
GSP has no direct relationship with whether it has conflicts or not. Even though a GSP scheme is 
orthogonal to occurring conflicts, we only choose GSP programs implemented by the EU as an 
instrument. This is because the EU‘s GSP scheme—which includes 176 developing countries 
and territories (especially, 50 LDCs) as beneficiaries—is mostly indifferent to political ties with 
the EU. This guarantees the validity of instruments for examining the effect of trade integration 
on conflict.
32 We also multiply the EU GSP by the geographical proximity from EU member 
countries to the recipients of the EU GSP program in order to exclude any possibility that GSP 
relationship could affect propensity to conflicts between them. We lag this variable by 6 years, 
which is the time required for GSP to affect the trade structure of beneficiary countries at t-2.
33 
GSP participation is expected to increase global trade openness while its relation to bilateral 
trade is ambiguous due to the distance multiplier. We use GSP program data from Rose (2005).   
The second instrumental variable is the measure of remoteness of dyads from the rest of 
world. This variable is routinely used in trade literature as an important determinant of bilateral 
trade flows  (i.e. Baier and Bergstrand, 2004).
34 This remoteness variable not only represents 
multilateral trade costs by capturing distance to all bilateral trade partners except  j of country i, 
                                                 
32 ―There was no unified foreign policy at the European level; hence, it is hard to believe that EU GSP scheme is 
used by the different members for their own foreign policy.‖(MMT 2008, p.890) For example, in terms of US GSP 
scheme, the political relationship between US and beneficiary countries seemed to affect the program and vice versa 
(see MMT 2008). 
33 Thus, the instrument variable is 4 year lagged for the endogenous regressors, the same as MMT (2008). 
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but  also  ―relative‖  bilateral  trade  costs  between  i  and  j.  Because  the  remoteness  variable  is 
constructed by the outside information of country pair (i, j), it is expected that remoteness is not 
affected  by  the  probability  of  bilateral  conflicts  between  i  and  j.  When  constructing  the 
remoteness variable, we exclude any third country (k) that had military conflicts with one of 
dyads at any moment in history. We also lag this variable by 2 years. An increase in remoteness 
of dyads is expected to increase bilateral trade of dyads, but decreases global trade.   
The third instrumental variable is the number of trading countries of dyads (lagged by 
2 years). This new variable is added to strengthen the validity of instrumental variable estimation. 
This variable is constructed by adding up the number of each country‘s trading partners whose 
trade flow is not missing and greater than zero. In counting the number of trading partners, we 
exclude any third country (k) which had military conflicts with one of dyads at any moment in 
history.  If  a  country  trades  with  a  larger  number  of  partners,  its  global  trade  integration  is 
expected to be larger. On the contrary, an increase in total trading partners of dyads can have an 
ambiguous effect on bilateral trade: it can divert the bilateral trade between two countries to 
other global partners so that bilateral trade decreases, while an increase in the number of trading 
partners of dyads implies that dyads are integrated more with global markets and thus their 
overall trade volume increases.  
Because there is no standard IV estimation methodology in the logit framework with 
clustered dyads, we follow one of solutions provided by Wooldridge (2001), which is to use an 
IV linear probability model with clustered errors. The logit model is non-linear, so we also use 
an IV probit model to check robustness of the instrumental variable approach and to reinforce the 
results.   
Table 6 shows the first stage regression of IV estimation. Columns (1) and (2) show the 
instrumentation  of  GSP,  remoteness  and  number  of  trading  partners  on  bilateral  trade 
interdependence, and global trade openness respectively. As expected, GSP has a positive effect 
on  global  trade  openness.  Remoteness  has  a  significantly  positive  effect  on  bilateral  trade 
dependence  and  a  significantly  negative  effect  on  global  trade  openness.  The  estimates  of 
number of trading partners on bilateral trade and global trade integration are both significantly 
positive. The existing econometric literature defines weak instruments based on the strength of 
the first-stage equation (Staiger and Stock, 1997, and Stock and Yogo, 2002). Cragg-Donald 
(1993) statistic for testing the null hypothesis—such that the instruments are weak when there  
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are multiple endogenous regressors—is 56.37. These test statistics are well above the critical 
values (13.43 at 10% maximal IV size) for weak instruments as reported by Stock and Yogo 
(2002). This implies that, according to the test for weak instruments, our first stage has good 
power and instruments are not weak.    
Table 7 presents the results of the second stage instrumental variable (IV) regressions.
35 
Column  (1)  of  Table 7  show s  the results  of  IV linear probability  model  regressions  and 
column (2) displays the result of IV probit regressions using the clustered bootstrap method.
36 
The results are broadly consistent with the logit estimation results.  Column (1) shows that an 
increase in both bilateral trade interdependence and global trade openness significantly promotes 
peace respectively at 10% and 1% critical levels. Column (2) also shows global trade integration 
reduces the probability of conflicts and other coefficients are qualitatively same as column (1). 
Hence, the negative effects of trade integration on military conflicts in the logit estimation do not 
reflect the reverse causality that runs from military conflicts to trade or the influence o f any 
omitted characteristics. Moreover, other controls have similar results with our base specification, 
column (3) of Table 4. In particular, in column (1) of Table 7, the estimated coefficient of  a 
security-alliance turns out to be significantly negative following the theory‘s prediction, and the 
coefficient of both GATT members becomes insignificantly negative. 
Columns (3) and (4) add the interactive terms of bilateral and global trade openness with 
the geographical proximity variables. The IV estimation results broadly support the basic result 
of logit estimation by confirming that the coefficients of bilateral and global trade openness 
depending on the  geographical  proximity of  countries  are  also  qualitatively the same as  the 
coefficients of logit model.  
We find no evidence of an over-identification problem. The joint-null hypothesis  for 
Sargan-Hansen‘s over-identification test—which implies that instruments are uncorrelated with 
                                                 
35 Table 6 shows the first-stage regression of column (1) of Table 7 
36 IV probit estimation with clustered standard errors is not allowed and the error that ―initial values are not feasible‖ 
shows up in STATA in this case. Therefore, we use the clustered bootstrap method, which constructs a number of 
re-samples of the observed data by dyads (clustered pairs) and then estimates by IV probit method. The bootstrap 
method is useful in reducing a finite sample bias. It is also used to get accurate statistical inference of the model 
when parametric inference is impossible or requires complicated formulas for calculating standard errors (Horowitz 
2001).    
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the error term—cannot be rejected. The test statistic of 0.898 (p-value is 0.343) in the case of 
specification of column (1) supports the exogeneity hypothesis of our instruments.
37  
 
4.6. Comparison with MMT (2008) and SW (2009) 
   In section 4.4, we point out the main differences of our results from MMT‘s results. In 
particular, MMT show that an increase in bilateral openness reduces the probability of conflict 
while an increase in multilateral openness raises the probability of conflict. However, figure 2 
shows in  most cases,  multilateral  openness  serve as a  conduit of peace.  In this  section,  we 
replicate MMT‘s regression in their table 3 and determine why MMT‘s results of globalization 
on peace are the opposite of ours.
38 Columns (1) and (2) replicate regressions (1) and (2) in table 
3 of MMT respectively. Through the regressions, MM T show the effect of multilateral trade 
openness on military conflicts is positive among geographically proximate country groups —
contiguous  pairs  and  contiguous  less  than  1000km  groups.  However,  these  regressions  are 
problematic due to ―omitted variables‖ which should be controlled. Including more explanatory 
variables  with  MMT‘s  controls,  we  report  column  (1)-1  and  (2)-1  which  show  that  the 
coefficient of multilateral openness of MMT could be contaminated with omitted variable bias. 
We use all basic control variables that MMT used, except log product land area (sum of log land 
area) variable. It seems that sum of log land area is not a good control variable because there is a 
land size asymmetry of countries. When summing the land size within a county-pair, it ignores a 
country‘s asymmetric land size which influences the probability of conflicts (i.e. larger countries 
have  more  diverse  ethnic  groups,  more  borders  adjacent  to  others  and  more  territory  to  be 
disputed, while smaller countries do not). Thus, the difference of land size between countries can 
be a more appropriate control for the military disputes. Instead, we use the relative military 
capability  measure,  which  can  gauge  the  country‘s  power  or  size  effect  on  conflicts. 
Consequently when we add possible factors which affect the probability of war, we nullify the 
positive effect of multilateral openness on conflict.  
Furthermore, MMT do not display the effect of bilateral and multilateral integration on 
peace  ―without  interaction  term‖  in  their  full  sample.  Columns  (3)-(5)  report  the  effect  of 
bilateral  and  multilateral  trade  openness  on  peace  with  other  controls  from  MMT‘s  full 
                                                 
37 Other over-identification test also cannot reject the null hypothesis. The J statistics of Sargan-Hansen test are 
2.742(p-value=0.1) in column (2), 5.03(0.08) in column (3) and 1.333(0.513) in column (4). 
38 MMT data is available on the website (http://team.univ-paris1.fr/teamperso/mayer/data/data.htm ).  
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regression sample. The coefficients of multilateral openness on conflict are significantly negative, 
which  means  that  increase  in  multilateral  trade  integration  supports  peace.  This  shows  that 
interestingly, even MMT‘s specification, with a full sample, supports the pacifying effect of 
globalization.  
Column (6) shows that the impact of bilateral and global trade openness varies depending 
on the distance between countries in MMT‘s full sample. In column (6), we also include the 
important control variables, such as relative military capability, major powers, oil-exporters, and 
religious similarity, that affect the likelihood of interstate conflict but are omitted in the MMT‘s 
base specification (see column (4) of table 3, MMT 2008). Particularly, the estimated coefficient 
on  the  interactive  term  between  global  trade  openness  and  distance  (-0.174,  s.e.=0.055)  is 
significantly  negative,  while  the  estimated  coefficient  on  global  trade  openness,  (1.274, 
s.e.=0.438) is positive.
 The two point estimates for global trade and its interaction terms imply 
that  the  overall  marginal  effect  of  multilateral  trade  openness  on  the  probability  of  military 
conflict is negative for almost entire range of the sample. In fact, the log distance threshold that 
changes the sign of the effect of multilateral trade openness on conflict decreases from 8.03 
(=3000 km) to 7.31 (=1495 km) as we include more control variables in the MMT‘s specification. 
Only for the countries for which bilateral distance ranges below 7.31 (=1495 km), which is less 
than 8% of the dyads in MMT‘s sample, the marginal impact of multilateral trade openness can 
be positive. The strong peace-promotion effect of global trade openness for most of all country 
pairs is confirmed, contrasting with the negative effect of bilateral trade openness on peace for 
the group of geographically distant country pairs.  
In column (7), we further control temporal correlation using cubic splines which controls 
all past war dummies during the 1950–2000, while MMT use 20 dyadic past war dummies (see 
the discussion of Beck et al. 1998). The estimation result in column (7) also confirms that the 
impact of multilateral trade openness varies depending on the distance between countries. The 
estimated coefficient on the interactive term between global trade openness and distance (-0.131, 
s.e.=0.071)  is  significantly  negative  at  the  10%  level,  while  the  estimated  coefficient  on 
multilateral  trade  openness,  (0.866,  s.e.=0.548),  is  positive  but  statistically  insignificant. 
Therefore, we confirm again the strong peace-promotion effect of multilateral trade openness.  
In  fact,  our  result  of  peace-promotion  effect  of  multilateral  trade  openness  is  also 
supported by a recent study by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009)—henceforth, SW. SW replicates  
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MMT‘s baseline specification with a genetic distance variable for the 1950-2000 period. They 
include MMT‘s trade variables (4 year lagged bilateral trade openness and multilateral trade 
openness) which are possibly correlated with the genetic distance in order to control omitted 
variable bias and to verify the significant effect of the genetic distance on conflicts. In column 
(2) of their table 9, two interaction terms of bilateral distance with the bilateral and multilateral 
trade openness variables are introduced into the specification.  
The estimated result in column (2) confirms that the impact of log multilateral trade 
openness  varies  depending  on  the  distance  between  countries  as  in  MMT  and  this  paper. 
However, when we gauge the effect of multilateral openness on conflicts based on the estimated 
parameters, SW‘s result support our conclusion that multilateral trade openness promotes peace. 
In SW‘s column (2) of table 9, the estimated coefficient on the interactive term between the 
multilateral trade openness and distance (-0.0093, t-stat.=2.656) is significantly negative at 1% 
critical  level,  while  the  estimated  coefficient  on  multilateral  trade  openness,  (0.0552,  t-
stat.=1.993) is significantly positive.
 The two point estimates for multilateral trade openness and 
its interaction terms imply that the overall marginal effect of multilateral trade openness on the 
probability of military conflict is negative for almost entire range of the sample (more than 
99.4% of the dyads in MMT's sample).  
Column (3) of SW‘s table includes additional trade institution terms such as FTA and 
numbers of GATT members in a country pair. The column (3) still shows the strong negative 
effect of multilateral trade openness. In their column (3) of table 9, the estimated coefficient on 
the interactive term between the multilateral trade openness and distance (-0.0098, t-stat.=2.854) 
is  significantly  negative,  whereas  the  estimated  coefficient  on  multilateral  trade  openness, 
(0.0595, t-stat.=2.191) is significantly positive.
  Thus, the log distance threshold that starts the 
peace promotion effect of multilateral trade openness on conflict is 6.07 (= 433 km), still very 
low.   
 
 
5.  The Impact of Military Interstate Disputes on Trade Integration 
 
We assess the effect of trade integration on military conflicts and find that both bilateral 
and global trade integration contribute to peace. However, the reverse causal effect from military  
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conflicts to trade integration remains an issue. A number of studies have assessed the effect of 
military conflicts on bilateral trade flows (Glick and Taylor, 2005, Blomberg and Hess, 2006, 
and MMT 2008), whereas how much military conflicts affect global trade of the states concerned 
has not been investigated to the same extent. This section analyzes the effect of military conflicts 
on bilateral and global trade integration. We adopt the gravity model analysis to evaluate the 
trade  effects  of  military  conflicts  (Anderson  and  van  Wincoop  2003).  The  extended  gravity 
model of bilateral trade takes the following form:  
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,     (10) 
where the dependent variable is a measure of bilateral trade interdependence of a dyad of states i 
and j at time t. MIDt-k (k=0,…5) are military conflict variables ranging from contemporaneous 
conflict to 5-year lagged conflict, and Yeart denotes a set of binary variables which are unity in 
year t. Xijt includes other control variables shown in the gravity equation (see Rose 2004, 2005). 
We include the square root of the product of the dyads‘ GDP, the square root of the product of 
their  GDP  per  capita,
39  geographical  proximity  (distance,  contiguity)  of  dyads,  common 
language, and colonial relationship dummy variables such as common colonizers and existence 
of a colonial relationship. The specification also has a preferential trade area —FTA and RTA 
dummy, a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to the same FTA/RTA, and a GATT 
membership  dummy  as  coded  1  if  two  countries  are  both  GATT  signatories  at  observation 
year(t). A GSP dummy is also added. Lastly, we add the remoteness, and the number of trading 
partners, which were used as instruments for bilateral trade in the previous section. Our trade and 
                                                 
39 A more detailed discussion of the gravity model is in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).   






































is ―multilateral resistance(P)‖ term and 
―bilateral resistance(t)‖ are symmetric between i and j. We assume the multilateral resistance is constant as 1 for 
simplicity (however, we control this in empirical specification).  
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2 which shows why we include square root of product of GDP of i and j.  
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GDP  variables  are  in  current  US  dollars  so  that  wrongly  deflated  problem  can  be  avoided 
(Baldwin and Taglioni 2006). Also, the remoteness variable possibly captures the 'multilateral 
resistance' that affects bilateral trade patterns.
40 
Table 9 shows the es timation results of regressing bilateral trade interdependence on 
military conflicts and other controls. We apply two different estimation techniques : Column (1) 
is estimated by pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) allowing for clustering of common country-
pair error terms over time and column (2) is the result of tobit estimation to correct the bias from 
zero observations.
41 Column (3) reports the result by the fixed-effects estimation controlling for 
unobserved country-pair fixed effects. All columns (1), (2), and (3) display very similar results. 
First, the results confirm the significant negative effects of military conflicts on bilateral trade 
integration. In column (1), the coefficients of all military conflict variables are significantly 
negative. The estimates imply that during a bilateral military conflict, bilateral trade integration 
declines by 0.007 over the  following 5 years, which is much larger than the predicted mean of 
bilateral trade dependence, 0.002.
42 In fact, in 94% of the dyads, bilateral trade dependence is 
lower than 0.007, so these dyads of states would lose all trade between them if a military conflict 
occurred and lasted over 5  years. In column (2),  with a tobit method capturing possible non -
linear relationships between bilateral trade dependence and conflict due to the many zero trade 
observations, the effect of military conflict on bilateral trade dependence is almost the same as 
the result of column (1). In column (3), using  fixed-effects estimation, the effects of military 
conflicts  on bilateral trade become s  smaller, but most of the estimated coefficients  remain 
negative and statistically significant.  
We also find that the conventional variables behave  quite similar to model predictions, 
with estimated coefficients statistically significant. The estimated coefficients on the  FTA/RTA 
membership dummy in all columns (1), (2) and (3) are positive and statistically significant. The 
                                                 
40 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) show that exports not only depend on bilateral trade costs, but also on bilateral 
trade  costs  relative  to  a  measure  of  both  countries‘  trade  costs  to  all  other  countries,  so  called  ‗multilateral 
resistance‘.  Baldwin  and  Taglioni  (2006)  and  Baier  and  Bergstrand  (2009)  use  different  methods  to  control 
‗multilateral resistance‘ in the gravity equation for bilateral trade flows.  
41 See Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Helpman et al.(2008) more about zero trade problem. 
42 ( | )/ ( | )
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(semi-elasticity).  Therefore,  bilateral  trade  integration  decreases  by  350%  when 




estimated  coefficient  on  the  GATT  membership  dummy  is  also  positive,  but  statistically 
significant only in the fixed-effect estimation. 
We slightly change the specification of the gravity model in section 2 to analyze the 
effect of military conflicts on global trade integration. The dependent variable is a measure of 
global trade integration  of dyads (i, j) at time t. The specification follows the basic gravity 
equation with contemporaneous and lagged military conflicts. For the other control variables, we 
alter some bilateral variables to have a more direct relationship with global trade patterns of 
dyads. For example, we include square root of the product of GDP (and GDP per capita) with all 













43 The GATT dummy variable is coded as 
1 when only one country in any dyad is a GATT member. This is because a country of any dyad 
that joins GATT is likely to trade more with other GATT members. Thus, we can expect this 
dummy variable to be positively related to global trade integration. We also include the sum of 
the number of countries using a common language wi th i and j. This variable controls cultural 
proximity of each country in a dyad with other countries, which can be related to the global trade 
cost of each country in the dyad. The number of other conflicts in t is included to control the 
externality of conflicts among countries that could affect a dyad‘s global trade integration. The 
specification also includes each country‘s remoteness, and the number of trading partners, and 
the EU GSP with distance variables that were used as instruments for global trade as outlined in 
the previous section. 
Table 10 displays the estimation results of global trade integration on military conflicts 
and  other  controls.  We  find  that  military  conflicts  have  a  negative  effect  on  global  trade 
integration. In column (1), the estimated coefficients of all military conflicts are significantly 
negative. This implies that a bilateral military conflict of a dyad reduces global (multilateral) 
trade  integration  by  0.15  over  the  ensuing  5  years,  which  means  global  trade  integration 
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which explains why we include square root of all other trading partners GDP of i and j.  
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decreases by 30% 
44 if a military conflict between countries occurred and lasted over 5 years. In 
the fixed-effect estimation of column (2), the estimated coefficients on one and two lagged 
military conflicts are statistically significant individually. The coeff icients of other military 
conflict variables are negative but become statistically insignificant. The estimation results of 
other control variables confirm our predictions. The estimated coefficients on the square root of 
GDP or GDP per capita of trading -partner variables are statistically significant. The estimated 
coefficients  on  the  one  GATT  membership  dummy  are  also  positive  and  statistically 
significant—a country‘s participation in  GATT makes  their trade increase with  other GATT 
members  while  decreasing  trade  with  non-GATT  members.  Lastly,  the  coefficients  on  the 
number of countries with common languages are significantly positive, which coincide with the 
conventional positive effect of common language on trade. 
 
 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
 
The  empirical  analysis  shows  that  an  increase  in  bilateral  trade  interdependence  and 
global trade openness significantly reduces the probability of military conflict between countries. 
Our empirical results are robust when controlling for the simultaneous determination of trade and 
peace.  
Our results also show that the peace-promotion effect of trade varies depending on the 
geographical proximity between countries.  Greater bilateral trade interdependence appears to 
bring about a considerably larger peace-promotion effect for neighboring countries. In contrast, 
greater  global  trade  openness  has  a  more  significantly  positive  effect  on  peace  for  distant 
countries than it does on neighboring ones.  
Overall, our results consistently show that trade integration has an important effect on 
conflict between states. A recent seminal paper in global trade and conflict (MMT, 2008) argues 
that globalization (increase in multilateral trade) can increase the probability of military conflict 
by  reducing  the  bilateral  dependence  to  any  given  country.  Our  empirical  findings  strongly 
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contest this argument. Our conceptual framework also shows that the critical assumptions in 
MMT do not hold robust in most cases.  
Our results show that globalization promotes peace through two channels: one from the 
increased  advantage  peace  holds  for  bilateral  trade  interdependence;  and  the  other  from  a 
country‘s integration into global markets, regardless of the size of trade with each trading partner. 
"Globalization" has been one of the most salient features of the world economy over the past 
century. At the same time, the number of countries involved in world trade has also increased 
significantly. However, despite the increase in the number of country pairs, the probability of 
dyadic military conflict has decreased.  
  Our findings also suggest that trade integration not merely results in economic 
gains, but can bring about significant political gains as well—such as a peace dividend between 
trading partners. It also explains why economic integration, whether regional or global, is often 
initiated to  satisfy  political  and security motives.  For example, the  raison  d’etre behind  the 
formation of the European Union following World War II was the desire for peace—particularly 
between France and Germany. Further research on quantitative assessments of peace dividends 
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Figure 1: The Changes of Bilateral and Multilateral Trade Flows Before, During and After Selected Incidences of Militarized 
Interstate Disputes (current USD million)  
1) Faklands War(1982) 
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3) Bangladesh War(1970) 
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5) Dominican Republic - 
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7) Hungarian Revolution 







































































Figure2. Quantifying the impact of bilateral and global trade integration on military 
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Table 1: Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1950–2000 





Observations  Observations 
   All dyads  572246     243225 
Non-Fighting dyads  569960     241979 
           
Fighting(MID) dyads  2286  100.00  1246  100.00 
Hostility 
level 
3 (Display of Force)  528  23.10  359  28.81 
4 (Use of force)  1494  65.35  837  67.17 
5 (War)  264  11.55  50  4.01 
Source: Constructed from the Database of the ―Correlates Of War (COW)‖ project with Maoz correction: Zeev 
Maoz  (2005), Dyadic MID Dataset (version 2.0): http://psfaculty.ucdavis.edu/zmaoz/dyadmid.html 
 
 
Table 2: Top 15 Countries Most Frequently Involved in the Militarized Interstate Disputes 
(MID), 1950–2000 
No  Country  # of MIDs 
5  4  3  2 
The country’s 
participation in 
total MID events 
(%) 






1  United States  160  3  55  92  10  10.97 
2  USSR/Russia   119  1  61  47  10  8.16 
3  China, People‘s Rep. of  113  4  73  28  8  7.75 
4  Iran  105  1  83  18  3  7.20 
5  Israel  95  5  69  18  3  6.52 
6  Iraq  84  3  69  11  1  5.76 
7  India  72  3  44  19  6  4.94 
8  Syria  68  4  51  12  1  4.66 
9  Turkey  61  2  33  17  9  4.18 
10  Egypt  60  5  33  19  3  4.12 
11  United Kingdom  57  4  23  25  5  3.91 
12  Thailand  46  2  27  14  3  3.16 
13  Pakistan  45  2  35  5  3  3.09 
13  Korea, Republic of  45  2  36  6  1  3.09 




Table 3: Summary Statistics 
  
(1) All  (2) Conflict   (3) No-Conflict 
(N=243,225)  (N=1,246)  (N=241,979) 






Dev.  Dev  Dev. 
Military Interstate Disputes  0.0051  0  0.0714  1  0  0  0 
Bilateral trade dependence 
(2 years lagged)  0.002  0.0003  0.0073  0.0062  0.0145  0.002  0.0073 
Global trade openness       
(2 years lagged)  0.4849  0.4206  0.3702  0.3504  0.281  0.4856  0.3705 
Contiguity  0.0412  0  0.1988  0.6051  0.489  0.0383  0.192 
Distance (log)  8.6005  8.77  0.8285  7.3542  1.1773  8.6069  0.8215 
Relative military capability 
(2 years lagged)  2.2485  1.91  1.6941  1.8587  1.5456  2.2505  1.6946 
Major powers dummy  0.102  0  0.3026  0.3242  0.4683  0.1009  0.3011 
Joint democracy index  
(2 years lagged)  0.3204  0.15  0.3359  0.2181  0.2664  0.3209  0.3361 
UN voting correlation  
(2 years lagged)  0.6513  0.713  0.2885  0.5721  0.4320  0.6518  0.2875 
Alliance (2 years lagged)  0.1057  0  0.3074  0.3042  0.4602  0.1046  0.3061 
Oil exporters dummy  0.1692  0  0.3723  0.2006  0.4006  0.1661  0.3721 
Religious Similarity  
(2 years lagged)  -0.2230  -0.348  0.5771  0.0414  0.6334  -0.2244  0.5765 
Common language  0.1553  0  0.3622  0.2801  0.4492  0.1547  0.3616 
Pair ever in colonial 
relationship  0.0211  0  0.1436  0.0811  0.2730  0.0207  0.1425 
Common colonizer  0.0882  0  0.2836  0.1067  0.3089  0.0881  0.2835 
FTA/RTA dummy (2 years 
lagged)  0.0172  0  0.1300  0.0233  0.1508  0.0172  0.1299 
Either GATT members 
dummy (2 years lagged)  0.4420  0  0.4966  0.4687  0.4992  0.4418  0.4966 
Both GATT members 
dummy (2 years lagged)  0.4600  0  0.4984  0.3435  0.4751  0.4606  0.4984 
Zero trade dummy  
(2 years lagged)  0.1016  0  0.3022  0.0570  0.2319  0.1019  0.3025 
Number of other conflicts 
at t  48.8426  45  14.2052  49.3507  13.9630  48.8400  14.2064 
Number of Peace years  23.1054  23  12.9263  6.9270  11.4979  23.1887  12.8807 




Table 4: Determinants of Militarized Interstate Disputes 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Bilateral trade dependence(t-2) 
-8.968**    -7.854  -82.594***  23.919*** 
[4.487]    [5.344]  [24.514]  [4.638] 
Global trade Openness(t-2) 
  -1.692***  -1.661***  1.963  -1.671*** 
  [0.427]  [0.429]  [1.195]  [0.548] 
Distance(log)×Bilateral trade 
dependence 
      11.789***   
      [3.030]   
Distance(log)× Global openness 
      -0.420**   
      [0.171]   
Contiguity × Bilateral trade 
dependence 
        -34.552*** 
        [6.246] 
Contiguity× Global openness  
        1.192** 
        [0.585] 
Contiguity 
2.424***  2.169***  2.194***  1.828***  1.626*** 
[0.194]  [0.188]  [0.189]  [0.179]  [0.249] 
Distance(log) 
-0.368***  -0.412***  -0.426***  -0.312***  -0.397*** 
[0.064]  [0.066]  [0.070]  [0.100]  [0.076] 
Relative Military Capability ratio 
(t-2) 
-0.231***  -0.215***  -0.219***  -0.166***  -0.173*** 
[0.042]  [0.042]  [0.042]  [0.038]  [0.038] 
Major powers dummy 
1.974***  1.649***  1.706***  1.498***  1.531*** 
[0.175]  [0.183]  [0.181]  [0.155]  [0.155] 
Joint democracy index(t-2) 
-1.160***  -1.145***  -1.072***  -1.193***  -1.170*** 
[0.249]  [0.252]  [0.251]  [0.223]  [0.221] 
UN voting (t-2) 
-0.778***  -0.746***  -0.753***  -0.505***  -0.532*** 
[0.208]  [0.198]  [0.198]  [0.179]  [0.181] 
Alliance(t-2) 
0.192  0.223  0.236  0.224  0.230* 
[0.171]  [0.164]  [0.163]  [0.142]  [0.135] 
Oil exporters dummy 
0.480***  0.638***  0.648***  0.504***  0.485*** 
[0.138]  [0.136]  [0.136]  [0.117]  [0.114] 
Religious Similarity(t-2) 
-0.254  -0.245  -0.243  -0.2  -0.193 
[0.169]  [0.159]  [0.156]  [0.127]  [0.125] 
Common Language 
0.312  0.293  0.314*  0.159  0.154 
[0.193]  [0.187]  [0.187]  [0.165]  [0.159] 
Pair ever in colonial relationship 
0.194  0.13  0.158  0.116  0.085 
[0.242]  [0.241]  [0.233]  [0.197]  [0.196] 
Common colonizer 
-0.323  -0.296  -0.304  -0.144  -0.119 
[0.267]  [0.253]  [0.251]  [0.212]  [0.204] 
FTA/RTA dummy(t-2) 
-0.756***  -0.857***  -0.775***  -0.812***  -0.872*** 
[0.229]  [0.231]  [0.223]  [0.214]  [0.206] 
Either GATT member dummy(t-2) 
0.237  0.21  0.195  0.19  0.197 
[0.180]  [0.175]  [0.174]  [0.145]  [0.142] 
Both GATT members dummy(t-2) 
0.632***  0.526***  0.520***  0.497***  0.501*** 
[0.190]  [0.187]  [0.186]  [0.160]  [0.158] 
Zero trade dummy(t-2) 
-0.098  -0.103  -0.133  -0.168  -0.172 
[0.186]  [0.185]  [0.187]  [0.175]  [0.176] 
Number of other conflicts(t) 
0.202***  0.220***  0.222***  0.416***  0.420*** 
[0.042]  [0.044]  [0.043]  [0.054]  [0.054] 
Number of Peace years 
-0.127***  -0.125***  -0.124***  -0.607***  -0.603*** 
[0.008]  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.033]  [0.034] 
Year Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cubic Spline(Dyadic War lags)  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Method  Logit  Logit  Logit  Logit  Logit 
Observations  243225  243225  243225  243225  243225 
R-squared  0.37  0.375  0.376  0.435  0.435 
Note: The dependent variable is a binary variable for a militarized conflict between a dyad of states. All time-varying explanatory 
variables are lagged by 2 years. The estimation allows for clustering of the error terms over time for country pairs. Clustered 
robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in bracket. ***, ** and * indicate that the estimated coefficients 




Table 5: Robustness Check (Other methods and trade integration measurements) 
  3 years lagged trade variables   Other Trade Dependence- The log 
of the arithmetic average   Skewed-logit (scobit) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Bilateral trade dependence 
-6.573  -82.636***  23.974***  -0.86  -13.365***  2.923***  -7.011  -93.519***  28.955*** 
[5.376]  [23.743]  [4.437]  [1.257]  [3.917]  [0.398]  [6.693]  [29.193]  [6.645] 
Global trade Openness 
-1.483***  2.572*  -1.767***  -0.714***  0.577  -0.723***  -1.778***  3.144*  -1.511** 
[0.459]  [1.341]  [0.638]  [0.122]  [0.530]  [0.133]  [0.477]  [1.888]  [0.610] 
Distance(log)×Bilateral 
trade dependence 
  11.901***      1.740***      13.853***   
  [2.922]      [0.428]      [3.771]   
Distance(log)× Global 
openness 
  -0.489**      -0.142**      -0.589**   
  [0.191]      [0.069]      [0.267]   
Contiguity × Bilateral 
trade dependence 
    -33.480***      -6.342***      -39.284*** 
    [5.735]      [1.322]      [8.769] 
Contiguity× Global 
openness 
    1.561**      0.436***      0.868 
    [0.655]      [0.164]      [0.684] 
Contiguity 
2.122***  1.726***  1.400***  2.125***  1.802***  2.172***  2.508***  2.449***  2.364*** 
[0.193]  [0.180]  [0.269]  [0.182]  [0.178]  [0.216]  [0.208]  [0.204]  [0.320] 
Distance(log) 
-0.418***  -0.281***  -0.385***  -0.435***  -0.511***  -0.415***  -0.525***  -0.454***  -0.596*** 
[0.071]  [0.108]  [0.076]  [0.067]  [0.096]  [0.078]  [0.101]  [0.130]  [0.086] 
Relative Military 
Capability ratio 
-0.212***  -0.153***  -0.164***  -0.188***  -0.160***  -0.180***  -0.246***  -0.204***  -0.207*** 
[0.042]  [0.038]  [0.038]  [0.044]  [0.040]  [0.039]  [0.047]  [0.046]  [0.046] 
Major powers 
1.689***  1.456***  1.493***  1.553***  1.445***  1.467***  2.019***  1.966***  2.006*** 
[0.182]  [0.156]  [0.155]  [0.184]  [0.161]  [0.159]  [0.228]  [0.188]  [0.189] 
Joint democracy index 
-0.986***  -1.009***  -0.988***  -1.099***  -1.154***  -1.116***  -1.264***  -1.671***  -1.678*** 
[0.236]  [0.205]  [0.202]  [0.254]  [0.220]  [0.220]  [0.290]  [0.269]  [0.270] 
UN voting 
-0.645***  -0.343*  -0.370**  -0.768***  -0.516***  -0.526***  -0.845***  -0.749***  -0.781*** 
[0.196]  [0.176]  [0.177]  [0.196]  [0.181]  [0.179]  [0.208]  [0.196]  [0.195] 
Alliance 
0.17  0.127  0.132  0.18  0.188  0.172  0.24  0.22  0.252 
[0.160]  [0.137]  [0.130]  [0.164]  [0.141]  [0.132]  [0.185]  [0.173]  [0.169] 
Oil exporters dummy 
0.660***  0.518***  0.498***  0.695***  0.583***  0.554***  0.640***  0.474***  0.459*** 
[0.138]  [0.116]  [0.113]  [0.139]  [0.120]  [0.118]  [0.149]  [0.141]  [0.138] 
Religious Similarity 
-0.234  -0.189  -0.185  -0.234  -0.184  -0.188  -0.274*  -0.201  -0.193 
[0.154]  [0.121]  [0.120]  [0.154]  [0.124]  [0.122]  [0.161]  [0.141]  [0.140] 
Common Language 
0.268  0.107  0.101  0.311*  0.147  0.142  0.349*  0.251  0.248 
[0.185]  [0.161]  [0.154]  [0.189]  [0.163]  [0.156]  [0.203]  [0.182]  [0.179] 
Pair ever in colonial 
relationship 
0.194  0.159  0.137  0.196  0.199  0.136  0.11  0.066  0.02 
[0.227]  [0.183]  [0.183]  [0.244]  [0.199]  [0.197]  [0.276]  [0.272]  [0.271] 
Common colonizer 
-0.266  -0.086  -0.048  -0.326  -0.137  -0.134  -0.469  -0.429*  -0.421* 
[0.246]  [0.206]  [0.198]  [0.248]  [0.208]  [0.202]  [0.289]  [0.260]  [0.254] 
FTA/RTA dummy 
-0.867***  -0.930***  -1.006***  -0.800***  -0.839***  -0.853***  -0.974***  -1.208***  -1.257*** 
[0.224]  [0.217]  [0.209]  [0.229]  [0.213]  [0.206]  [0.269]  [0.305]  [0.293] 
Either GATT member 
dummy 
0.209  0.191  0.199  0.204  0.183  0.178  0.23  0.328*  0.341** 
[0.182]  [0.154]  [0.149]  [0.175]  [0.146]  [0.140]  [0.188]  [0.168]  [0.167] 
Both GATT members 
dummy 
0.548***  0.484***  0.489***  0.530***  0.500***  0.470***  0.644***  0.725***  0.744*** 
[0.189]  [0.162]  [0.159]  [0.186]  [0.161]  [0.157]  [0.216]  [0.194]  [0.195] 
Zero trade dummy 
-0.184  -0.171  -0.175  -0.11  -0.169  -0.183  -0.118  -0.058  -0.066 
[0.197]  [0.188]  [0.188]  [0.189]  [0.176]  [0.176]  [0.199]  [0.199]  [0.199] 
Number of other 
conflicts(t) 
0.232***  0.446***  0.449***  0.214***  0.414***  0.413***  0.263***  0.610***  0.611*** 
[0.043]  [0.054]  [0.054]  [0.043]  [0.054]  [0.054]  [0.049]  [0.078]  [0.078] 
Number of Peace years 
-0.130***  -0.606***  -0.601***  -0.124***  -0.605***  -0.598***  -0.131***  -0.843***  -0.839*** 
[0.007]  [0.032]  [0.032]  [0.007]  [0.033]  [0.034]  [0.007]  [0.050]  [0.051] 
Year dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cubic Splines (War lags)  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  233167  233167  233167  243225  243225  243225  243225  243225  243225 
R-squared  0.382  0.443  0.444  0.378  0.436  0.437  --  --  -- 
Note: Clustered robust standard errors by dyads are reported in bracket. Intercept and year dummies are included(not reported). 




Table 6: Instrument Variable Estimation: First Stage Regression of column (1), table 7 
Dependent Variables  Bilateral Trade Dependence  Global Trade Openness 
EU GSP IV 
-0.00002*  0.004*** 
[0.00001]  [0.0009] 
Remoteness IV 
0.0022***  -0.0368*** 
[0.0007]  [0.0094] 
Number of trading partners IV 
0.00004***  0.0009*** 
[0.00001]  [0.0001] 
Contiguity 
0.0057***  -0.1005*** 
[0.0011]  [0.0141] 
Distance(Log) 
-0.002***  -0.0223*** 
[0.0003]  [0.0045] 
Relative Military Capability(t-2) 
-0.0001***  0.0053*** 
[0.00003]  [0.0019] 
Major powers dummy 
0.0034***  -0.1541*** 
[0.0004]  [0.0080] 
Joint democracy index(t-2) 
0.0013***  0.0627*** 
[0.0003]  [0.0067] 
UN voting(t-2) 
-0.0004**  0.0091 
[0.0002]  [0.0079] 
Alliance(t-2) 
-0.0003  -0.0098 
[0.0005]  [0.0094] 
Oil exporters dummy 
0.0015***  0.0354*** 
[0.0002]  [0.0069] 
Religious Similarity(t-2) 
-0.0003***  -0.0003 
[0.0001]  [0.0043] 
Common Language 
0.00004  0.0370*** 
[0.0004]  [0.0125] 
Pair ever in colonial relationship 
0.005***  -0.0255 
[0.0008]  [0.0167] 
Common colonizer 
0.0003  0.0548*** 
[0.0005]  [0.0128] 
FTA/RTA dummy(t-2) 
0.0094***  0.0104 
[0.0014]  [0.0129] 
Either GATT member dummy(t-2) 
0.00003  -0.0319*** 
[0.0002]  [0.0102] 
Both GATT members dummy(t-2) 
0.0003  -0.1100*** 
[0.0002]  [0.0103] 
Zero trade dummy(t-2) 
-0.0006***  0.0740*** 
[0.0001]  [0.0101] 
Number of other conflicts(t) 
-0.00005*  -0.001* 
[0.00003]  [0.0006] 
Number of Peace years 
0.0002***  0.0268*** 
[0.00007]  [0.002] 
F-test on IVs  10.15  58.49 
Stock and Yogo weak IV F-statistic  56.37 
Critical value for highest quality IV 
(10% maximal IV size)  13.43 
Observations  219590  219590 
(Uncentered) R-square  0.266  0.694 
Note: Clustered robust standard errors by dyads are in brackets. The first stage regressions that include interaction terms with distance and 




Table 7: Instrument Variable Estimation: Second Stage IV Regression  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Bilateral trade dependence(t-2) 
-1.088*  -16.857  -9.111**  -0.353 
[0.646]  [29.828]  [3.984]  [1.791] 
Global trade Openness(t-2)  -0.050***  -1.935***  0.06  -0.051*** 
[0.011]  [0.644]  [0.095]  [0.011] 
Distance(log)×Bilateral trade dependence 
    1.185**   
    [0.584]   
Distance(log)× Global openness      -0.014   
    [0.011]   
Contiguity × Bilateral trade dependence 
      -1.698 
      [4.232] 
Contiguity× Global openness  
      -0.074 
      [0.237] 
Contiguity  0.052***  0.679***  0.059***  0.096 
[0.007]  [0.219]  [0.009]  [0.066] 
Distance(log) 
-0.005***  -0.247***  -0.0001  -0.005** 
[0.001]  [0.052]  [0.005]  [0.002] 
Relative Military Capability ratio(t-2)  0  -0.057***  -0.0001  -0.0003 
[0.000]  [0.016]  [0.0002]  [0.0002] 
Major powers  0.004  0.425***  -0.002  0.002 
[0.003]  [0.150]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Joint democracy index(t-2)  0.001  -0.219**  0.001  0.001 
[0.001]  [0.103]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
UN voting (t-2)  -0.004***  -0.205***  -0.003*  -0.004** 
[0.002]  [0.072]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Alliance(t-2) 
-0.004**  0.035  -0.007***  -0.005 
[0.002]  [0.065]  [0.002]  [0.003] 
Oil exporters dummy  0.005***  0.296***  0.002  0.005 
[0.001]  [0.070]  [0.002]  [0.004] 
Religious Similarity(t-2)  -0.001*  -0.077  -0.001  -0.001 
[0.001]  [0.047]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Common Language 
0.003**  0.120*  0.004**  0.003** 
[0.001]  [0.068]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Pair ever in colonial relationship  0.006  0.118  -0.005  0.001 
[0.005]  [0.168]  [0.006]  [0.007] 
Common colonizer  0.003*  0.023  0.003  0.002 
[0.002]  [0.105]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
FTA/RTA dummy(t-2)  -0.004  -0.232  0.002  -0.002 
[0.006]  [0.299]  [0.007]  [0.007] 
Either GATT member dummy(t-2) 
0  0.031  -0.002  -0.001 
[0.001]  [0.068]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Both GATT members dummy(t-2) 
-0.002  0.002  -0.005**  -0.003 
[0.002]  [0.105]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Zero trade dummy(t-2)  0.005***  0.049  0.008***  0.005** 
[0.001]  [0.092]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Number of other conflicts(t) 
0.007***  0.217***  0.007***  0.007*** 
[0.001]  [0.025]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Number of Peace years 
-0.022***  -0.217***  -0.021***  -0.021*** 
[0.002]  [0.023]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Year dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 











Method  IV LPM  IV Probit  IV LPM  IV LPM 
Observations  219590  219590  219590  219590 
R-squared  0.057  --  0.028  0.043 
Note:  Clustered  robust  standard  errors  by  dyads  and  bootstrap  standard  errors—column  (2)—are  reported.  IV  probit  estimation  with 




Table 8: Comparison with MMT (2008) 
  Contiguous pairs  Contiguous pairs and 
<1000km  Full Sample 
  (1)  (1)-1  (2)  (2)-1  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
ln bil. Openness t-4 
-0.09***  -0.034  -0.127**  -0.042  0.016  0.023  0.028  -0.292**  -0.488*** 
[0.032]  [0.040]  [0.050]  [0.055]  [0.033]  [0.034]  [0.029]  [0.129]  [0.139] 
ln mult. Opennes t-4 
0.039  -0.03  0.275**  0.17  -0.288***  -0.237**  -0.153*  1.273***  0.866 
[0.106]  [0.118]  [0.124]  [0.158]  [0.093]  [0.100]  [0.093]  [0.438]  [0.548] 
# of peace years 
-0.07***  -0.058***  -0.060***  -0.049***  -0.054***  -0.051***  -0.182***  -0.018***  -0.179*** 
[0.011]  [0.011]  [0.014]  [0.012]  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.009]  [0.002]  [0.009] 
Distance(log) 
-0.088  -0.159  0.206  0.285  -0.594***  -0.635***  -0.528***  -0.578***  -0.234 
[0.111]  [0.128]  [0.222]  [0.248]  [0.089]  [0.100]  [0.081]  [0.166]  [0.202] 
Contiguity 
        1.738***  1.806***  1.350***  1.389***  1.371*** 
        [0.242]  [0.263]  [0.217]  [0.186]  [0.206] 
ln distance 
* ln mult. Openness 
              -0.174***  -0.131* 
              [0.055]  [0.071] 
ln distance 
* ln bil. Openness 
              0.045***  0.069*** 
              [0.017]  [0.018] 
Zero trade t-4 
  0.303    0.448  -0.294  -0.19  -0.153  -0.283*  -0.144 
  [0.231]    [0.294]  [0.196]  [0.199]  [0.181]  [0.158]  [0.177] 
UN vote correlation 
(t-4) 
  -0.047    0.036  -1.224***  -1.057***  -0.803***  -0.761***  -0.701*** 
  [0.269]    [0.376]  [0.190]  [0.198]  [0.177]  [0.151]  [0.179] 
Sum of democracy 
  0.445**    0.529**  -0.038  -0.064  -0.223  -0.250**  -0.211 
  [0.193]    [0.242]  [0.176]  [0.178]  [0.151]  [0.125]  [0.149] 
# other wars in t 
  0.180***    0.175***  0.245***  0.238***  0.215***  0.228***  0.216*** 
  [0.034]    [0.050]  [0.010]  [0.011]  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.010] 
ln distance to 
nearest war in t 
  0.061    0.113  0.217***  0.242***  0.135*  0.146**  0.143* 
  [0.102]    [0.131]  [0.082]  [0.086]  [0.078]  [0.072]  [0.079] 
Alliance 
  -0.176    -0.159  -0.07  -0.092  -0.038  0.06  -0.075 
  [0.191]    [0.287]  [0.191]  [0.202]  [0.164]  [0.120]  [0.161] 
Common language 
  0.18    -0.107  0.414**  0.468**  0.343*  0.307**  0.318 
  [0.254]    [0.322]  [0.202]  [0.227]  [0.200]  [0.134]  [0.194] 
Pair ever in colonial 
relationship 
  0.024    0.075  0.233  0.269  0.183  0.347*  0.195 
  [0.286]    [0.393]  [0.334]  [0.333]  [0.265]  [0.202]  [0.257] 
Common colonizer 
  0.016    -0.185  0.062  0.044  0.142  0.111  0.132 
  [0.284]    [0.411]  [0.270]  [0.271]  [0.243]  [0.184]  [0.240] 
Free trade area 
(full set) 
  -0.24    -0.32  -0.428  -0.653**  -0.615***  -0.375**  -0.538** 
  [0.263]    [0.291]  [0.274]  [0.269]  [0.233]  [0.179]  [0.226] 
# of GATT members 
  -0.191    -0.278*  -0.097  -0.073  0.043  0.071  0.025 
  [0.129]    [0.158]  [0.107]  [0.112]  [0.098]  [0.085]  [0.096] 
Major powers 
  -1.765***    -2.584***    0.552***  0.486**  0.666***  0.346* 
  [0.488]    [0.764]    [0.208]  [0.196]  [0.152]  [0.198] 
Oil exporters dummy 
  -0.141    0.012    0.183  0.043  0.183  0.012 
  [0.275]    [0.388]    [0.173]  [0.150]  [0.123]  [0.145] 
Religious Similarity 
(t-4) 
  -0.389    -0.117    -0.176  -0.138  -0.051  -0.129 
  [0.250]    [0.297]    [0.189]  [0.152]  [0.096]  [0.150] 
Relative Military 
Capability(t-4) 
  -0.05    -0.003    -0.126**  -0.091*  -0.085**  -0.096* 
  [0.078]    [0.150]    [0.059]  [0.053]  [0.043]  [0.050] 
Year dummy  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Dyadic war lags  No  No  No  No  No  No  Y(spline)  Yes  Y(spline) 
Method  Logit  Logit  Logit  Logit  Logit  Logit  Logit  Logit  Logit 
Observations  7826  6780  4558  3822  227613  221334  221334  221334  221334 




Table 9: Impact of Military Conflicts on Bilateral Trade Dependence 
Dependent Variable  Bilateral Trade Dependence 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Conflict(t) 
-0.00128***  -0.00122***  -0.00032 
[0.00037]  [0.00038]  [0.00023] 
Conflict(t-1) 
-0.00121***  -0.00123***  -0.00059*** 
[0.00029]  [0.00030]  [0.00020] 
Conflict(t-2) 
-0.00115***  -0.00117***  -0.00052** 
[0.00028]  [0.00029]  [0.00021] 
Conflict(t-3) 
-0.00095***  -0.00091***  -0.00025 
[0.00027]  [0.00028]  [0.00016] 
Conflict(t-4) 
-0.00116***  -0.00113***  -0.00064*** 
[0.00031]  [0.00032]  [0.00014] 
Conflict(t-5) 
-0.00160***  -0.00153***  -0.00072*** 
[0.00036]  [0.00036]  [0.00019] 
Square root of Product GDP 
0.00986***  0.01001***  0.00465*** 
[0.00137]  [0.00138]  [0.00096] 
Square root of  Product GDP per capita 
0.12639***  0.15412***  -0.05904** 
[0.02069]  [0.02102]  [0.02899] 
Remoteness 
0.00173***  0.00177***  0.00285*** 
[0.00046]  [0.00048]  [0.00102] 
Number of trading partners 
0.00002***  0.00004***  0.00003*** 
[0.00001]  [0.00001]  [0.00001] 
GSP dummy 
0.00016  0.00055***  -0.00047*** 
[0.00012]  [0.00014]  [0.00012] 
Contiguity 
0.00624***  0.00625***  -- 
[0.00119]  [0.00119]   
Distance(log) 
-0.00196***  -0.00222***  -- 
[0.00022]  [0.00024]   
Log Product land areas 
-0.00008**  -0.00003  -- 
[0.00003]  [0.00003]   
Common language 
-0.00003  0.00001  -- 
[0.00040]  [0.00041]   
Common colonizers 
0.00025  0.00035  -- 
[0.00050]  [0.00054]   
Pair ever in colonial relationship 
0.00569***  0.00605***  -- 
[0.00091]  [0.00091]   
FTA/RTA dummy 
0.00825***  0.00794***  0.00448*** 
[0.00117]  [0.00115]  [0.00053] 
Both GATT members dummy 
0.00011  0.00003  0.00016* 
[0.00011]  [0.00011]  [0.00008] 
Year dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Method  OLS  Tobit  Fixed Effect 
Observations  252518  252518  252518 
R-squared  0.228  --  0.796 
Note: Clustered robust standard errors by dyads are in brackets.  The results without the contemporaneous military conflict (t) is also 




Table 10: Impact of Military Conflicts on Global Trade Integration 
Dependent Variable  Global Trade Openness 
  (1)  (2) 
Conflict(t) 
-0.01829***  0.00641 
[0.00666]  [0.00468] 
Conflict(t-1) 
-0.03095***  -0.01333*** 
[0.00538]  [0.00488] 
Conflict(t-2) 
-0.02734***  -0.00821** 
[0.00542]  [0.00351] 
Conflict(t-3) 
-0.02077***  -0.00258 
[0.00477]  [0.00360] 
Conflict(t-4) 
-0.02167***  -0.00469 
[0.00410]  [0.00313] 
Conflict(t-5) 
-0.02927***  -0.00610* 
[0.00543]  [0.00358] 
Square root of Product GDP of Partners of dyads(i,j) 
0.00005***  0.00002*** 
[0.00000]  [0.00000] 
Square root of Product GDP per capita of Partners of 
dyads(i,j) 
0.03057***  -0.00425 
[0.00171]  [0.00280] 
Remoteness 
-0.02178***  0.55209*** 
[0.00713]  [0.04187] 
Number of trading partners 
0.00091***  0.00338*** 
[0.00010]  [0.00027] 
EU GSP*Distance(t-4) 
0.00183**  -0.00043 
[0.00080]  [0.00070] 
Contiguity 
-0.05716***  -- 
[0.01351]   
Distance(log) 
-0.02004***  -- 
[0.00388]   
FTA/RTA dummy 
-0.00483  0.01209* 
[0.00944]  [0.00633] 
Number of countries in Common language with 
dyads(i,j) 
0.00122***  0.00136*** 
[0.00012]  [0.00023] 
One of dyads in GATT (Excluding Both GATT) 
0.05453***  0.03032*** 
[0.00533]  [0.00465] 
Number of other conflicts in t 
-0.00601***  -0.00211*** 
[0.00028]  [0.00036] 
Zero trade dummy 
0.05600***  0.01312* 
[0.00922]  [0.00737] 
Year dummy   Yes  Yes 
Method  OLS  Fixed Effect 
Observations  252665  252665 
R-squared  0.174  0.681 
Note: Clustered robust standard errors by dyads are in brackets.  The results without the contemporaneous military conflict (t) is also qualitatively 




Appendix 1: Derivation of Equation (6) 
In order to get change in utility by conflict, we totally differentiate equation (5) with 
respect to  x and change the elasticity form. L is a percent change(decrease) of welfare 
by conflict 
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 by multiplying the second term by 
  1
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